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53ANDRÁS KOLTAY: What is press freedom now?ANDRÁS KOLTAYWhat is press freedom now?New media, gatekeepers, and the old principles of the lawThe concept of media freedom, in modern European philosophical and legal thinking, is constantly changing. Originally, back in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it did not necessarily mean more than the exclusion of state intervention prior to publication, while still allowing prosecutions to begin after publication. By the twentieth century, in 
WKH DJH RI PDVV PHGLD WKLV QDUURZ GH¿QLWLRQ ZDV QR ORQJHU VXVWDLQDEOH:LWK WKHrecognition in various jurisdictions of the idea that the media have a fundamental task in the democratic public sphere, these states needed to draw the respective conclusions which, in turn, affected the concept of media freedom. This concept is about to be 
UHGH¿QHG RQFH DJDLQ WKDQNV WR QHZ SDUWLFLSDQWV WKDW KDYH EHFRPH DFWLYH SOD\HUV LQtransmitting various content to the general public. In this paper we wish to examine 
ZKHWKHU LW LV MXVWL¿HG WR UHWKLQN WKHQRWLRQRIPHGLD IUHHGRPKDYLQJ UHJDUG WR WKHVHnew participants. In part 1, we examine the differences between freedom of speech and media freedom (freedom of the press) in order to identify the content of the currently used notion of ‘media freedom’. Part 2 provides an overview of the different elements of the legal notion of ‘media’. In part 3 we shall reveal who might be the holders of the right to media freedom, which new players might claim protection under this right and the unique tasks they play in the operation of the democratic public sphere. Part 4 discusses the relationship between the internet and the democratic public sphere, and 
EULHÀ\DVVHVVHVWKHIDGLQJKRSHVWKDWZHUHSUHVHQWDW WKHGDZQRIWKHLQWHUQHWDJH,Q
SDUWZHEULHÀ\GUDZSRVVLEOHFRQFOXVLRQVIURPWKHSUHYLRXVSDUWVZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHfuture role of the state. (Hereinafter the notions of ‘media freedom’ and ‘freedom of the press’ will be used interchangeably, as synonyms.)The difference between freedom of speech and media freedomDifferences between the American and European approaches
,QRUGHUWRGH¿QHZKDWFRQVWLWXWHVPHGLDIUHHGRPDQGWKHUHODWHGFRQVWLWXWLRQDOUXOHVLW
LV ¿UVW QHFHVVDU\ WR FODULI\ZKHWKHU SUHVV IUHHGRP LV GLIIHUHQW IURP WKH IXQGDPHQWDOright of freedom of speech. The answer to this question will have serious consequences 
IRUGH¿QLQJWKHWDVNVRIWKHVWDWHUHODWHGWRSURWHFWLQJIXQGDPHQWDOULJKWV
54 Comparative Perspectives on the Fundamental Freedom of ExpressionIn the past, freedom of speech and the freedom of the press were not typically differentiated within legal doctrines. Even the prominent English constitutional lawyer Albert Dicey used both these terms alternately, as synonyms.1 They were used with identical meanings in the legal system of the United States, in the rulings and legal literature related to the First Amendment, despite the fact that the freedom of the press is mentioned distinctly, in the form of the Press Clause, in the American Constitution.2 
7KLV ODFN RI GLVWLQFWLRQ LV TXLWH HYLGHQW QRW HYHQ WKH 6XSUHPH&RXUW RI WKH8QLWHGStates has been able to assign distinct and independent substance to the fundamental right of the freedom of the press.3 This lack of distinction does not, however, disadvantage the operation of the media, thanks to the extensive protection granted to the freedom of speech. The media are thus not subject to stringent legal restrictions, although neither are they awarded any additional rights.All this has not, however, dissuaded certain American authors from arguing for the distinction between the freedom of the press and freedom of speech.4 Justice Potter Stewart argued that the freedom of the press, as opposed to freedom of speech, is not an individual right but is the right of the media as an institution.5 The media constitute the 
RQO\ W\SH RI SULYDWH HQWHUSULVH ZKLFK HQMR\V VSHFL¿F FRQVWLWXWLRQDO SURWHFWLRQ6 The freedom of the press does not protect any individual working for a media outlet but the institution itself and, consequently, it is also the institution that is entitled to any additional rights and should bear any additional obligations attached to this freedom.7 Justice William Brennan opined in an address that he did not view the freedom of the press as a right which must be broadly unrestricted, unlike the freedom of speech. 1 Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Macmillan 1885).2 0HOYLOOH % 1LPPHU µ,QWURGXFWLRQ ,V )UHHGRP RI WKH 3UHVV D 5HGXQGDQF\:KDW 'RHV LW$GG WRFreedom of Speech?’ (1975) 26 Hastings Law Journal'DYLG/DQJHµ7KH6SHHFKDQG3UHVV&ODXVHV¶(1975) 23 UCLA Law Review  :LOOLDP: 9DQ $OVW\QH µ7KH +D]DUGV WR WKH 3UHVV RI &ODLPLQJ D“Preferred Position”’ (1977) 28 Hastings Law Journal 761.3 (GZLQ&%DNHU µ7KH ,QGHSHQGHQW6LJQL¿FDQFHRI WKH3UHVV&ODXVHXQGHU([LVWLQJ/DZ¶ Hofstra Law Review±(XJHQH9RORNKµ)UHHGRPIRUWKH3UHVVDVDQ,QGXVWU\RUIRUWKH3UHVVDVDTechnology? From the Framing to Today’ (2012) 160 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 459. 4 )LUVWVXUHO\-HURPH$%DUURQµ$FFHVVWRWKH3UHVV$1HZ)LUVW$PHQGPHQW5LJKW¶Harvard Law Review 1641, and Jerome A Barron, Freedom of the Press for Whom? The Right of Access to Mass Media (Indiana University Press 1975).5 Potter Stewart, ‘“Or of the Press”’ (1975) 26 Hastings Law Journal 631.6 Zurcher v Stanford Daily, 436 US 547, 576 (1978), Justice Stewart’s dissenting opinion. See also Keith J Bybee, ‘Justice Stewart Meets the Press’ (2014) in Helen J Knowles and Steven B Lichtman (eds), Judging Free Speech: First Amendment Jurisprudence of US Supreme Court Justices (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).7 Similarly in American legal literature see also Randall P Bezanson, ‘Institutional Speech’ (1995) 80 Iowa Law Review)UHGHULFN6FKDXHUµ7RZDUGVDQ,QVWLWXWLRQDO)LUVW$PHQGPHQW¶Minnesota Law Review(GZLQ&%DNHUHuman Liberty and Freedom of Speech (OUP 1989) in particular 229 
DQG(GZLQ&%DNHUµ3UHVV5LJKWVDQG*RYHUQPHQW3RZHUWR6WUXFWXUHWKH3UHVV¶University of Miami Law Review2ZHQ0)LVVµ)UHH6SHHFKDQG6RFLDO6WUXFWXUH¶Iowa Law Review 
$OODQ&+XWFKLQVRQ µ7DONLQJ WKH*RRG/LIH)URP)UHH6SHHFK WR'HPRFUDWLF'LDORJXH¶ Yale Journal of Law and Liberation 17.
55ANDRÁS KOLTAY: What is press freedom now?He suggested that the media must acknowledge that the nature of their work is such that 
WKH\KDYHWRWDNHPXOWLSOHSRVVLEO\FRQÀLFWLQJLQWHUHVWVLQWRFRQVLGHUDWLRQDVZHOODV
IXO¿OOLQJ FHUWDLQ H[WUD REOLJDWLRQV8 Brennan, similarly to Stewart, underlines the interests of the community as the basis of freedom of the press, which is what distinguishes it from the freedom of speech.Although they are yet to feature in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, similar views are aired in recent literature on the subject. Lyrissa Lidsky criticised the decisions of the Court (the ‘Roberts Court’, currently led by Chief Justice Roberts) for failing to recognise freedom of the press as a right distinct from those enjoyed when exercising freedom of speech, with the result that the media cannot be granted additional rights 
VSHFL¿F WR WKHP9 Sonja West also argues for the ‘separate identity’ of the media,10 suggesting that the freedom of the press should not be restricted to the right of publication and distribution, and that it does not simply protect the free use of certain technologies, 
EXWDOVRIXO¿OVDGHPRFUDWLFIXQFWLRQ11 According to West, if we grant the protection of the freedom of the press to everyone who exercises their freedom of the speech, and to the same extent, this will paradoxically result in the devaluation of press freedom, since this approach would fail to take the unique social role of the media into consideration.12 The media and the journalists working in the media not only publish different opinions 
EXW ¿UVW DQG IRUHPRVW WKH\ DOVR DFW DV WKHPDLQ GULYHU HQJLQH DQG IRUXP RI SXEOLFdiscourse. The media cannot be treated on the same footing as a group of individuals exercising their right to freedom of speech through loudspeakers, not even if today, thanks to the advent of new technologies, anyone can collect and even publish news.13 Lidsky and West’s arguments today are thus in the tradition of Brennan and Stewart. Although not even these thoughts can be considered as a majority view in American legal literature, they are even so much ‘gentler’ than the approach of Edwin Baker, who can be considered as a radical compared to mainstream theoreticians of freedom of the press. Baker viewed the different participants in the media as among the representatives of ‘private power’ who, based on their economic and political interests, deliberately distort democratic publicity. He therefore not only argued for the separation of the freedom of speech and the freedom of the press, but also for the limitation of media operation.14    8 William J Brennan, ‘Address’ (1979) 32 Rutgers Law Review 173.     9 Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, ‘Not a Free Press Court?’ (2012) Brigham Young University Law Review 1819, in particular 1831–35.10 Sonja R West, ‘Press Exceptionalism’ (2014) 127 Harvard Law Review 2434, and Sonja R West, ‘Awakening the Press Clause’ (2011) 58 UCLA Law Review 1025.11 See West (n 10) 2441.12 ibid 2442.13 ibid 2445.14 Edwin C Baker, ‘Press Performance, Human Rights, and Private Powers as a Threat’ (2011) 5 Law & Ethics of Human Rights(GZLQ&%DNHUµ3ULYDWH3RZHUWKH3UHVVDQGWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ¶Constitutional Commentary(GZLQ&%DNHUMedia, Markets and Democracy &83(GZLQ&Baker, Advertising and a Democratic Press (Princeton University Press 1994).
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 7XUQLQJ IURP WKH $PHULFDQ DXWKRUV DQG OHJDO V\VWHP ZH ¿QG WKDW (XURSHDQconstitutions and, based on these, the individual legal systems try to separate freedom of speech from the freedom of the press. There are independent laws governing the 
PHGLDLQDOORIWKHFRXQWULHVRI(XURSH7KH(XURSHDQ8QLRQKDVDOVRGUDZQXSVSHFL¿Fregulations on audiovisual media services.15 This distinction between the two rights is 
VLPLODUO\UHÀHFWHGLQOHJDOOLWHUDWXUH167KRPDV*LEERQVVWUHVVHGLQDUHFHQWDUWLFOHWKDWthe freedom of speech is a right enjoyed by individuals and not by institutions (media enterprises), whereas the owner’s right attached to the media is not unconditional and is not the same as the freedom of speech.17 At the same time, the recognition of the media as an ‘institution’ is important, because if it is strong enough it can resist external pressure. That said, it may also be subject to restrictions in the interest of the community.18Although article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights on freedom of expression does not mention media freedom as a separate right, the recognition of this 
ULJKWLVLPSOLHGE\WKHWH[WZKHQLWPDNHVVSHFL¿FUHIHUHQFHWRWKHLPSDUWLQJRILGHDVand the operation of radio and television. Furthermore, the jurisprudence founded on this Convention has been contributing to the body of law dealing with the limits of press freedom for decades. It is also worth noting that paragraph 2 of Article 10 states that ‘the exercise of these freedoms . . carries with it duties and responsibilities.’ The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) consistently stresses that the media have a duty, or rather an obligation, to impart information of public interest and ideas related to matters of public interest.19If one recognises freedom of the press as a right which is independent in nature then certain special rights and obligations stem from that recognition. As such, making a distinction between freedom of speech and freedom of the press is not only a matter of principle. If these two rights are considered as distinct then different partial rights and obligations can be attached to them. Obviously, media workers enjoy freedom of speech, but this right can only be exercised within the framework of the special regulations applied to the media as an institution. On the other hand, taking into account 15 'LUHFWLYH (8 RI WKH (XURSHDQ 3DUOLDPHQW DQG RI WKH &RXQFLO RI 0DUFK  RQ WKHcoordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States 
FRQFHUQLQJWKHSURYLVLRQRIDXGLRYLVXDOPHGLDVHUYLFHVFRGL¿HGYHUVLRQ16 )RU WKH FODUL¿FDWLRQ RI WKHRUHWLFDO LVVXHV VHH HJ (ULF %DUHQGW µ,QDXJXUDO /HFWXUH 3UHVV DQG
%URDGFDVWLQJ)UHHGRP'RHV$Q\RQH+DYHDQ\5LJKWVWR)UHH6SHHFK"¶Current Legal Problems
*HRIIUH\0DUVKDOOµ3UHVV)UHHGRPDQG)UHH6SHHFK7KHRU\¶Public Law 40. 17 7KRPDV*LEERQVµ)UHH6SHHFK&RPPXQLFDWLRQDQGWKH6WDWH¶LQ0HUULV$PRV±-DFNLH+DUULVRQ±Lorna Woods (eds), Freedom of Expression and the Media (Nijhoff 2012) 36.18 ibid.19 See eg Observer and Guardian v the United Kingdom$SSQRMXGJPHQWRI1RYHPEHU1991), Sunday Times v the United Kingdom$SSQRMXGJPHQWRI1RYHPEHUThorgeir Thorgeirsson v Iceland $SSQR MXGJPHQWRI -XQHMGN Ltd v the United Kingdom 
$SSQRMXGJPHQWRI-DQXDU\Uj v Hungary $SSQRMXGJPHQWRI-XO\2011).
57ANDRÁS KOLTAY: What is press freedom now?the special role of the media in furthering democracy, they are also entitled to additional protection. These extra rights may include the protection of journalists’ sources, the 
SDUWLDOLPPXQLW\RIHGLWRULDORI¿FHVDJDLQVWVHDUFKHVRIWKHLUSUHPLVHVE\WKHDXWKRULWLHVspecial entry and access rights (for example, to the location of otherwise private or restricted access events), the protection of journalists against the owners of the given 
PHGLDRXWOHWDQGWKHDGYHUWLVHUVRUFHUWDLQ WD[EHQH¿WVSURYLGHGWR WKHPHGLD$W WKHsame time, the media in Europe are subject to special content regulations such as the restriction of hate speech and content harmful to children, the protection of human dignity and the restriction of commercial communications. It is also subject to copyright regulations, limitations on entrance to the market and restrictions on ownership to 
SUHYHQW H[FHVVLYHPDUNHW LQÀXHQFH$OVR UHOHYDQW DUH WKHPXVWFDUU\ DQGPXVWRIIHUrules whereby the minimum quantity of the broadcast European (and in, certain states, 
HYHQQDWLRQDO FRQWHQW LV GH¿QHGRQ WKH EDVLV RI SURJUDPPHTXRWDV DQGPDQ\ VWDWHVrequire balanced coverage and the right of reply. In consequence of the recognition of the positive character of the media, every state in Europe maintains, operates and 
¿QDQFHV D V\VWHP RI SXEOLF VHUYLFH EURDGFDVWLQJ SXEOLF PHGLD VHUYLFHV ZKLFK LV
DVVLJQHGDPRQJRWKHUVWZRLPSRUWDQWIXQFWLRQVWRWDNHLQWRDFFRXQWWKHQHHGVRIWKH
DXGLHQFHQRWVDWLV¿HGE\WKHPDUNHWDQGWRSURYLGHDQDXWKRULWDWLYHDQGFRPSUHKHQVLYHnews service.The existence of and rationale behind these rights and obligations are rooted in the ‘old’ media system in which, apart from the printed press, there were no media other than radio and television. However, in 2007 the AVMS Directive also placed certain new services (on-demand media services, most of which are accessible via the Internet) under the scope and effect of a European-level framework of regulations. The High 
/HYHO*URXS FRPPLVVLRQHG E\ WKH (XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ WR UHYLHZ WKH VLWXDWLRQ RImedia freedom and pluralism in Europe established, in its report dated January 2013, 
WKDWWKHSUROLIHUDWLRQRI,QWHUQHWVHUYLFHVUHVXOWVLQOHJDOXQFHUWDLQW\VLQFHLWLVGLI¿FXOWto discern which rules apply to the different services and which state has jurisdiction over any given service. The report found that journalists continue to have rights and 
GXWLHVLQWKHQHZPHGLDODQGVFDSHEXWWKDWQHZUHJXODWLRQVDUHGH¿QLWHO\UHTXLUHG20The negative and positive character of media freedomIf we recognise the independent characteristics of media freedom, we have to deal with a new problem stemming from it. Fundamental rights typically have a negative character, since these oblige the state to respect these rights vis-á-vis its citizens, for the 20 7KH5HSRUW RI WKH+LJK/HYHO*URXSRQ0HGLD)UHHGRPDQG3OXUDOLVP KHUHLQDIWHU UHIHUUHG WR DV
+LJK /HYHO *URXS  HFHXURSDHXLQIRUPDWLRQBVRFLHW\PHGLDBWDVNIRUFHGRFSOXUDOLVPKOJKOJB¿QDOBreport.pdf>.
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EHQH¿W DQG SURWHFWLRQ RI WKRVH FLWL]HQV +RZHYHU WKH QHJDWLYH FKDUDFWHU RI PHGLD
IUHHGRPLQLWVHOILVQRWVXI¿FLHQWWRDFFRPPRGDWHWKHHQWLUHW\RIWKHLPSRUWDQWLQWHUHVWVrelated to the operation of the democratic public sphere. It is thus necessary also to recognise the positive character of freedom of the press. This differentiation between the different fundamental rights has its roots in the theory of Isaiah Berlin.21 Berlin considered the scope of action provided to an individual, free of external interference, as a negative freedom (freedom from something or somebody), whereas he viewed the freedom to decide, ie the individual’s freedom of self-mastery, as a positive freedom (freedom to do something). John Rawls also stresses that, for most individuals, it is not the civic status of being free that is really important, but the opportunity to enjoy liberty.22 As far as the freedom of the press is concerned, the negative character means that communication via the media is free from external interference, whereas the positive character means the protection of the interest to ensure that anyone can have free access to media content and that media content is diverse and imparts diverse opinions (the latter might also be called the right to information—or, more simply, the ‘right to know’—which, however, has not yet been recognised as a real, independent fundamental right). This means that whereas the negative character (freedom from the interference of external powers, hence primarily from the state) is an actual right of the media, it is in the interest of the media audience (and hence, in a broader sense, of all society) that its positive character be recognised. It also follows from the recognition of this interest that media regulations impose certain public service obligations on the media that serve to satisfy the interest of free access to 
LQIRUPDWLRQ%\ WDNLQJ WKHVH VHHPLQJO\FRQÀLFWLQJSRVLWLYHDQGQHJDWLYHFKDUDFWHUVinto account jointly, by subjecting them to a single legal regulatory framework and by ensuring a certain balance between rights and obligations, the content and contours of 
WKHIUHHGRPRIWKHSUHVVDUHGH¿QHG,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRKLJKOLJKWWKDWWKHUHFRJQLWLRQRIits positive character is not the same as positive media freedom, since the latter means direct access to the different forums of the media. An example of the latter is the recognition of the right of reply in certain legal systems.23 This entails that the holder of the right of reply is entitled to express their position, even against the will of the given media outlet, following news coverage affecting them. Another good example of this right to access is the mandatory publication of political advertisements in television and radio broadcasts during election periods. The positive character of media freedom —which is distinct from the direct access rights—does not shift the audience out of its 
SDVVLYLW\7KH\FDQQRW LQÀXHQFHPHGLDFRQWHQWDFWLYHO\QHYHUWKHOHVV WKHLU LQWHUHVW LQregard to obtaining a wide range of information can be recognised under law.21 Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (OUP 1969).22 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press 1971) 204. 23 $QGUiV.ROWD\µ7KH5LJKWRI5HSO\LQD(XURSHDQ&RPSDUDWLYH3HUVSHFWLYH¶Acta Juridica Hungarica 73.
59ANDRÁS KOLTAY: What is press freedom now?In the early stages of the discussion of media freedom it was naturally the negative 
FKDUDFWHURISUHVVIUHHGRPWKDWSUHGRPLQDWHGDQGWKLVULJKWZDVWKHQLGHQWL¿HGDVWKHprohibition of censorship. Today, external interference in media freedom is possible on a much broader scale than simply by directly restricting the communication of opinions. The media market is much more regulated than other enterprises. The law restricts 
WKH RZQHUVKLS RI PHGLD RXWOHWV GH¿QLQJ D OLPLW EH\RQG ZKLFK WKH VDPH RZQHU LV
QRW SHUPLWWHG WR REWDLQ DGGLWLRQDO ULJKWV 7KH GLIIHUHQW SURJUDPPH ÀRZ VWUXFWXUHrequirements imposed on radio and television media service providers directly affect the content of the media. Some of these rules stipulate negative requirements (time limitation of advertisements, parental ratings, restriction of pornographic content, etc.), whereas other requirements demand expressly positive, active behaviour from the media outlets (balanced news coverage and programme quotas). The recognition of the positive character of press freedom (the audience’s interests) originates in the acknowledgement of the democratic tasks and duties of the media. These issues had already spawned a substantial body of literature before the spread of the Internet. The notion of the media’s social responsibility is not unheard of in the United States either, though it has not appeared in the media regulations. In its report 
LVVXHGLQWKH+XWFKLQV&RPPLVVLRQHQWUXVWHGWRUHYLHZDQGUHGH¿QHWKHVRFLDOrole of the media, created a theory of the social responsibility of the media, hitherto unknown in the United States.24 According to the Commission, the greatest risk to media freedom is that, despite technical developments and the increase in the volume of 
WKHSUHVV ZKLFKDW WKHVDPHWLPHPDGHPDUNHWHQWU\VLJQL¿FDQWO\PRUHH[SHQVLYHaccess to the media is more restricted, fewer voices may be heard in the media, and for the most part, even those few fail to acknowledge their responsibility towards society.25 Some of the American authors expressed ideas which would be familiar to Europeans, notwithstanding the differences between the two legal systems. A frequently cited article by Judith Lichtenberg asserts that the freedom of the press is a tool necessary for the proper operation of democracy, which can obviously be used for economic purposes as well, but which is always subject to certain requirements to serve the public interest.26 In his book, Cass Sunstein argues for a ‘second New Deal’, since modern media not only fail to help the operation of democracy but may even hinder it. As the commercial media expand, hope that the training of active citizens will play a crucial role in participatory democracies is waning.27 Owen Fiss expressly warned the 24 Commission on Freedom of the Press, A Free and Responsible Press. A General Report on Mass Communication: Newspapers, Radio, Motion Pictures, Magazines, and Books (University of Chicago Press 
-RKQ&1HURQHLast Rites: Revisiting four Theories of the Press (University of Illinois Press 1995) 77–100. 25 Lee C Bollinger, Images of a Free Press (University of Chicago Press 1991) 28–34. 26 Judith Lichtenberg, ‘Foundations and Limits of Freedom of the Press’ in Judith Lichtenberg (ed), Democracy and the Mass Media (CUP 1990) 104–105. 27 Cass R Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (2nd edn, Free Press 1995). See also Cass R Sunstein, ‘A New Deal for Speech’ (1994–1995) 17 Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal&DVV56XQVWHLQµ)UHH6SHHFK1RZ¶University of Chicago Law Review 255.
60 Comparative Perspectives on the Fundamental Freedom of Expressioncitizens of the former socialist countries who had just recently regained their liberty of the risk of adopting the media regulatory solutions of the Western world without criticism and proper consideration. He concluded that the media conditions spawned by the ‘creative power’ of the free market would have many characteristics similar to those of the media conditions of the former, dictatorial regimes.28 The notion of equality appears alongside and supplementary to the democratic concept of media freedom as 
WKHMXVWL¿FDWLRQIRUVWDWHLQWHUYHQWLRQ297KLVHTXDOLW\LVIRUPDOUDWKHUWKDQVXEVWDQWLDOit means creating a balance in terms of access. A portion of the recent legal literature (in Europe, in a fundamentally changed media landscape) acknowledges the differentiation between the positive and negative 
FKDUDFWHUV RIPHGLD IUHHGRP*LEERQV VWUHVVHV WKDW LQ UHVSHFW RI WKHPHGLD SULYDWH
HQWHUSULVHVPD\DOVRIXO¿OSXEOLFIXQFWLRQVRYHUDQGDERYHWKHVHUYLFHRIWKHLUSULYDWHinterests. In relation to the media, it is not credible to maintain that private organisations do not have a public function in addition to their private activities.30 In the interest of ensuring access to the media, privately held media enterprises are also required to take into account the interests of their audiences and to convey different opinions, the 
PDWHULDOVSXEOLVKHGE\WKHPVKRXOGQRWH[FOXVLYHO\UHÀHFWWKHWDVWHVDQGYLHZVRIWKHLUowners or editors.31Arguments against the recognition of the positive character of media freedom usually originate from the United States. According to mainstream US legal literature, anything, including the laissez-faire operation of the market is better than state 
LQWHUYHQWLRQRUVWDWHUHJXODWLRQLQWHUYHQWLRQE\WKHVWDWHLVDWEHVWXQQHFHVVDU\RUHYHQevil. Andrew Kenyon presents a brief summary of these arguments, on the basis of which media freedom is a right to which everyone is equally entitled, with the implication that everyone may express their opinions freely and may freely use the media to disseminate such opinions without any restrictions from the state. Equality is thus achieved without any state or government intervention (action). According to this model, state intervention inevitably distorts the operation of the media and provides certain actors with advantages over others, thereby encroaching upon the rights stemming from the First Amendment.32 European legal thought, conversely, does not have any theoretical objections to state measures intended to ensure fair access to the media and accepts the regulations described above on the duties of the media, the vast majority of which (with the exception of the protection of minors, the limitation of the concentration of ownership 28 2ZHQ0)LVVµ%XLOGLQJD)UHH3UHVV¶LQ$QGUiV6DMyDQG0RQURH(3ULFHHGVRights of Access to the Media (Kluwer Law International 1996). 29 Kenneth L Karst, ‘Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment’ (1975) 43 University of Chicago Law Review 20. 30 6HH*LEERQVQ31 ibid 39.32 Andrew T Kenyon, ‘Assuming Free Speech’ (2014) 77 The Modern Law Review 379, 381–85.
61ANDRÁS KOLTAY: What is press freedom now?and the regulation of commercial communications) would be unacceptable and indeed unconstitutional, under US law, even in principle. In areas where regulation does exist, the intervention is much less robust than that applied under European legal systems.Eric Barendt argues that the freedom of speech can be subjected to regulation in order ‘to make its exercise more effective’.33$FFRUGLQJ WR*LEERQV µWKHVWDWHVKRXOGnot avoid responsibility for the protection of the freedom of speech, in particular, access to the audience and fair participation in dialogue.’34 Kenyon, having analysed the legal literature examining the positive character of media freedom, states that ‘debate and 
GLYHUVLW\ RI LGHDV FDQQRW EH DVVXPHG LQ PDUNHWEDVHG PDVV PHGLD IRU GHEDWH DQG
GLYHUVLW\WRÀRXULVKUHTXLUHVVXSSRUWEH\RQGPDUNHWV¶35
.HQ\RQDOVRQRWHVWKDWWKHMXULVSUXGHQFHRIWKH(&W+5SURYLGHVQR¿UPIRXQGDWLRQVfor the positive right of press freedom. At the same time, several decisions of the Court make mention of the importance of media pluralism.36 Although even attempting to 
GH¿QHWKHFRQFHSWZRXOGEHDEROGXQGHUWDNLQJ37 in essence media pluralism is a value which is served by several rules related to the positive character of media freedom that are intended to ensure access to the media, for example, the requirement of balanced coverage, the right of reply, the must-carry rule and programme quota regulations may be regarded as such. At the same time, media pluralism is supported by not only positive, but also negative provisions such as, for example, the limitations on ownership in the media market. Although the ECtHR has not passed decisions on all of these, the tribunal has, on several occasions, recognised the role of the right of reply in reinforcing the positive character of press freedom.38 We cannot ignore the importance of the enhancement of media literacy either, as this may contribute to the exercise of media freedom in a positive sense. At the same time, however, media literacy is not primarily a legal issue and, if it is provided with regulatory support, usually no objections made on the basis of constitutional press freedom will be upheld.33 Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech (2nd ed, OUP 2005) 69.34 6HH*LEERQVQ35 See Kenyon (n 32) 398. 36 LELG±7KHVHGHFLVLRQVDUHDVIROORZVInformationsverein Lentia v Austria$SSQRV
MXGJPHQWRI1RYHPEHUTele 1 Privatfernsehgesellschaft mbH v Austria $SSQRMXGJPHQWRI6HSWHPEHUCentro Europa 7 S.R.L. and Di Stefano v Italy$SSQRMXGJPHQWRI-XQHManole v Moldova$SSQRMXGJPHQWRISeptember 2009).37 3HJJ\ 9DOFNH HW DO µ7KH (XURSHDQ 0HGLD 3OXUDOLVP 0RQLWRU %ULGJLQJ /DZ (FRQRPLFV DQGMedia Studies as a First Step towards Risk-Based Regulation in Media Markets’ (2010) 2(1) Journal of Media Law 85.38 Ediciones Tiempo SA v Spain$SSQRMXGJPHQWRI-XO\Melnychuk v Ukraine 
$SSQRMXGJPHQWRI-XO\Vitrenko and others v Ukraine$SSQRMXGJPHQWRI
'HFHPEHUKaperzynski v Poland$SSQRMXGJPHQWRI$SULO
62 Comparative Perspectives on the Fundamental Freedom of ExpressionThe concept of ‘media’Having come closer to identifying the concept of the ‘freedom of the press’, the next step is to examine who and which entities may be subject to or hold this right.Despite the fact that newer and newer forms of media have evolved, for a long time 
WKHVXEVWDQFHRIWKHFRQFHSWUHPDLQHGXQFRQWURYHUVLDO7KHFODVVL¿FDWLRQRIWKHSULQWHGpress, as well as radio and television, under the concept of ‘media’ was beyond dispute. 
,WLVDOVREH\RQGGLVSXWHWKDW¿OPVVKRZQLQFLQHPDVERRNVDQGÀ\HUVGLVWULEXWHGRQthe streets cannot be regarded as media (ie as belonging under the scope of media regulation), nor can the products of organisations also involved in the collection and 
SXEOLFDWLRQRIGDWDVXFKDVFUHGLWDJHQFLHV¿QDQFLDOVHUYLFHSURYLGHUVWUDYHODJHQFLHVand meteorological institutions.39 
7KHSUHYLRXVµWUDGLWLRQDO¶FRQFHSWGH¿QHVZKLFKDFWLYLWLHVDUHUHOHYDQWWRLWRQWKHbasis of the various forms (publication and distribution methods) of the media. Technology has now reached a stage of development, however, where this in itself 
FDQQRW SURYLGH VXI¿FLHQW JXLGDQFH $V D UHVXOW RI WKH SKHQRPHQRQ RI PHGLDconvergence, the relationship between the various types of content and the forms of 
SXEOLFDWLRQRIWKHPHGLDWKDWFDUU\WKHPKDVZHDNHQHGWRGD\SULQWHGQHZVSDSHUVFDQbe read on the Internet and we can watch television on our mobiles. Furthermore, the newly evolving forms of communication (blogs, comments, private websites and social 
PHGLDFDQEHFODVVL¿HG LQ WKHHDUOLHUFDWHJRULHVRQO\ZLWKJUHDWGLI¿FXOW\DQGDW WKHcost of major inconsistencies.
7R GH¿QH WKH FRQFHSW RI WKH PHGLD WKH QRWLRQ RI µDXGLRYLVXDO PHGLD VHUYLFH¶provided by the AVMS Directive may be of help,40 according to which the Directive 
DSSOLHVWRVHUYLFHVWKDWDUHa) offered as a commercial service, b) offered under the editorial responsibility of the service provider, c) offered with a purpose to inform, entertain or educate,d) offered with the purpose of reaching the general public. In principle, the concept may be extended to include other media, such as radio and the press, too, although this is not present in the Directive. It is important to note that, since the primary goal of the EU in respect of the Directive was to regulate the single 
PDUNHWLWRQO\GHDOVZLWKIRUSUR¿WVHUYLFHVLHWKRVHWKDWDUHSURYLGHGFRPPHUFLDOO\
ZLWK WKHREMHFWLYHRI DFKLHYLQJD¿QDQFLDOSUR¿W DQGDUHRSHUDWHGDW D¿QDQFLDO ULVNincluding public service media and community media). This is a major restriction in comparison with the ‘traditional’ substance of the concept of the media. If we were to adapt this concept to the press, for example, this would result in the exclusion of student or local government newspapers and any other publications in which the 39 David A Anderson, ‘Freedom of the Press’ (2002) 80 Texas Law Review 442–44. 40 AVMS Directive, art 1(1)a).
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SXEOLVKHU KDVQRPDMRU FRPPHUFLDO LQWHUHVW7KLV LV DOVR DQ DFFHSWDEOH DSSURDFK IRUexample, Hungarian media regulation extends the concept of the Directive over both radio stations and the press.41The other three conceptual elements (editorial responsibility, informative, educational or entertainment purpose and provision to the general public) conform to 
WKH µWUDGLWLRQDO¶ FRQFHSW RI WKH PHGLD KRZHYHU LW LV TXHVWLRQDEOH ZKHWKHU WKH\ DUH
VXI¿FLHQW WRFRYHUHYHU\WKLQJWKDWPD\EHUHJDUGHGDVµPHGLD¶ WRGD\DQGFRQYHUVHO\that it would exclude everything that should not be regarded as such.However strong the role of the press may be in this area, the debates of public life 
DUH QRW OLPLWHG WR WKH IRUXPVSURYLGHG E\ WKH SUHVV GLVFXVVLRQV EHWZHHQ IULHQGV DUHprobably more effective in shaping the views of their participants than the nightly news programmes. At the same time, not all media players wish to act as a forum for the 
FRPPXQLW\¶VGLVSXWHVQRZDGD\VWKHYDVWPDMRULW\RIWKHFRQWHQWDYDLODEOHLQWKHPHGLDhas absolutely no relevance to public life. It is for just this reason that David Anderson argues in a paper that, since the concept of the media cannot be circumscribed precisely on the basis of the form of its publication, and since the operation of a substantial part of the traditional media is not directed at performing the task expected of it in the 
LQWHUHVWRIWKHFRPPXQLW\LWZRXOGWKHUHIRUHPDNHPRUHVHQVHWRUHGH¿QHWKHFRQFHSWon the basis of its function.42 That is, if a given newspaper, television station, or website operates in such a way as to ensure conformity with its traditional media role, it is to be regarded as ‘media’ in the legal sense, too. According to the European concept, this traditional role is the service and operation of the democratic public sphere. All polemical papers, expert materials and recommendations dealing with the new concept of the media emphasise the media’s democratic tasks.43A paper by Jan Oster presents arguments that are similar to those of Anderson. Examining the issue from the perspective of the democratic tasks of the media, he recommends a new, functional approach, on the basis of which only such individuals or undertakings may be regarded as media who are involved in the ‘gathering and disseminating to a mass audience information and ideas pertaining to matters of public interest on a periodical basis and according to certain standards of conduct governing the news-gathering and editorial process.’4441 $UWLFOHRIWKH3UHVV)UHHGRP$FW$FWQR&,9RI6HH$QGUiV.ROWD\HGHungarian Media Law (CompLex 2012) ch 3.42 See Anderson (n 39).43 6HHDOVRDPRQJRWKHUV+LJK/HYHO*URXSQFKDQG(XURSHDQ%URDGFDVWLQJ8QLRQµ2QWKHRoad to a Hybrid World of TV and Web Thoughts for the Future of Connected TV by the EBU’ (background 
SDSHU ZZZHEXFK¿OHVOLYHVLWHVHEX¿OHV.QRZOHGJH,QLWLDWLYHV3ROLF\7RSLFDO,VVXHV
+\EULG(%8%DFNJURXQG3DSHURQ&RQQHFWHG79SGI!5HFRPPHQGDWLRQ&0 Rec(2011)7 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on a new notion of media (hereinafter referred 
WRDV5HFRPPHQGDWLRQSDUDKWWSVZFGFRHLQW9LHZ'RFMVS"LG !44 Jan Oster, ‘Theory and Doctrine of “Media Freedom” as a Legal Concept’ (2013) 5(1) Journal of Media Law 74.
64 Comparative Perspectives on the Fundamental Freedom of ExpressionOster’s argument is logical and well-structured. It proceeds from the proposition that 
WKHPHGLD FRQVWLWXWH D OHJDOO\ UHFRJQLVHG LQVWLWXWLRQZLWK VSHFL¿F ULJKWV DQG GXWLHV45 The protection granted to the media is not identical to the protection of the freedom of speech, because the role of the media is indispensable for the operation of democracy and the informing of citizens.46 (Section 1 of the present paper has also touched upon these notions.) This responsibility calls for media that are actors in the marketplace of ideas47, serving the operation of this marketplace in a regular, responsible and professional manner according to the appropriate professional and ethical norms.48 This concept of Oster’s, then, does not include those actors—whether bloggers or traditional journalists—who, although they regularly communicate to broad audiences, do so without the intention of serving the cause of the democratic public sphere as described above.49 Within the context of the decisions of the US Supreme Court, Sonja West also stresses that the undue extension of the concept of media to include the new services carries the risk of imperilling the extra protection awarded to the media, and that members of the press must be differentiated from ‘occasional public commentators’.50 The function of the media is to oversee and collect information about the social and political elites and to safeguard democracy. The mere intention or the actual opportunity 
RU H[HUFLVH RI SXEOLF H[SUHVVLRQ LV QRW VXI¿FLHQW WR IXO¿O WKHVH FULWHULD 7KH EORJJHUpeering at the computer screen and the media as an institution that is granted constitutional protection must be differentiated in the interest of the society.51 This does 
QRWPHDQ KRZHYHU WKDW WKH IRUPHU LV WR EH OHIWZLWKRXW SURWHFWLRQ EORJJHUV UHPDLQprotected by the right of freedom of speech and are, in a certain respect, in a better position than the media—although they enjoy no extra rights, while unlike the media they are not burdened with extra obligations, either.In a paper prepared for the Council of Europe, Karol Jakubowicz examined the 
SRVVLEOHHOHPHQWVRIWKHQHZFRQFHSWRIWKHPHGLD5DWKHUWKDQSURYLGLQJDGH¿QLWLRQhe outlined new approaches to its examination and some possible further categories within the new media. He pointed out that all ‘old’ media (the press, television, radio) become ‘new’ media as well, once they become accessible online. Furthermore, he 45 LELGíí46 LELGí47 See the dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes, Abrams v the United States, 250 US 616 (1919).48 See also the British test of ‘responsible journalism’, the cases of Reynolds v Times Newspapers 
>@ $&  DQGFlood v Times Newspapers >@ :/5  WKH 'HIDPDWLRQ$FW RI and the report closing the Leveson Inquiry (An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press) 
KWWSVZZZJRYXNJRYHUQPHQWSXEOLFDWLRQVOHYHVRQLQTXLU\UHSRUWLQWRWKHFXOWXUHSUDFWLFHVDQGHWKLFVof-the-press>. See also the decisions of the ECtHR, eg White v Sweden$SSQRMXGJPHQWRI
6HSWHPEHUFlux and Samson v Moldova$SSQRMXGJPHQWRI2FWREHU49 See Oster (n 44) 78.50 See West (n 10) 1070.51 LELGí
65ANDRÁS KOLTAY: What is press freedom now?distinguished between content created by users but published in the institutional media (user generated content) and content created by users that is published outside of the institutional media (user created content).52
7KH UHSRUWRI WKH+LJK/HYHO*URXSRQ0HGLD)UHHGRPDQG3OXUDOLVPDOVR VWDWHVthat, in the interest of granting their rights effective protection and, in parallel with this, 
GH¿QLQJWKHLUGXWLHVDQGOLDELOLWLHVMRXUQDOLVWVQHHG¿UVWWREHLGHQWL¿HG53 Although the 
UHSRUW GRHV PDNH PHQWLRQ RI FHUWDLQ VXFK LGHQWL¿FDWLRQ FULWHULD²SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQorganised journalism training, membership of mandatory journalists’ chambers and professional organisations, full-time journalistic employment—in the end it rejects them one by one, leaving the issue open.
7KHUHFRPPHQGDWLRQRIWKH&RXQFLORI(XURSHDOVRFDOOVIRUWKHGH¿QLWLRQRIDnew concept of the media.54 The recommendation takes off from the premise that the ‘new ecosystem’ of the media includes all those actors who participate in the process of the generation and distribution of content, transmitting such content to a potentially large number of people (content aggregators, application developers, users who create content, enterprises responsible for the operation of the infrastructure), on condition that such actors possess editorial control or oversight over the given content.55 The decisive element here, then, is the existence of editorial responsibility. 
7KHDQQH[RIWKH5HFRPPHQGDWLRQVHWVIRUWKVL[FULWHULDWKDWDVHUYLFHVKRXOGIXO¿O
LQRUGHUWREHUHJDUGHGDVPHGLD7KHVHDUH(1) Intent to act as media, (2) Purpose and underlying objectives of media—to produce, aggregate or disseminate media content, (3) Editorial control, (4) Professional standards, (5) Outreach and dissemination, (6) Compliance with public expectations, such as accessibility, diversity, reliability, transparency, etc.This recommendation by the Council of Europe suggests points of comparison rather 
WKDQSURYLGLQJDVROLGFRQFHSWIRUWKHGH¿QLWLRQRIWKHPHGLD,WVZHDNQHVVLVWKDWWKHVHcriteria throw up a multitude of problematic details (just what are the professional 
VWDQGDUGVDQGZKR VKRXOGGH¿QH WKHP":KDW DUH WKHH[SHFWDWLRQVRI WKHFRPPXQLW\
DQGZKRVHWDVNLVLWWRLGHQWLI\WKHP":KLOH2VWHU¶VGH¿QLWLRQRIµPHGLD¶DOVROHDYHVDnumber of issues unresolved it is much narrower and thus more ‘manageable’, although 
LWFOHDUO\SRVHVDQXPEHURIULVNV,IOHJDOUHJXODWLRQLVWRGHFLGHZKDWTXDOL¿HVDVPHGLD52 Karol Jakubowicz, A new Notion of Media? Media and Media-like Content and Activities on new Communication ServicesEDFNJURXQGWH[W&RXQFLORI(XURSHZZZFRHLQWWGJKOVWDQGDUGVHWWLQJ
PHGLDGRF1HZB1RWLRQB0HGLDBHQSGI!53 6HH+LJK/HYHO*URXSQV54 See Recommendation (n 43).55 LELGSDUDVí
66 Comparative Perspectives on the Fundamental Freedom of Expressionand, within that, what falls within the scope of ‘public affairs’ and what information it is 
LQ WKH SXEOLF LQWHUHVW WR SXEOLVK WKLV ZLOO OHDG WR GLI¿FXOWLHV RI FRGL¿FDWLRQ DQG WKH
UHVXOWLQJGH¿QLWLRQPD\HDVLO\EHRIIWKHPDUNPLVVLQJFHUWDLQLPSRUWDQWPHGLDZKLOHunnecessarily including others. At any rate, emphasising the professional nature of the 
PHGLDLVQRORQJHUMXVWDWKHRUHWLFDOLVVXHRIPHGLDODZWKH,QWHUQHWKDVWUDQVIRUPHGWKHprevious forms of news service and news consumption to such an extent that the economic foundations of traditional media (both in print and online) are in jeopardy. 
7RGD\WKHUHGH¿QLWLRQRIWKHFRQFHSWRIWKHPHGLDLV¿UVWDQGIRUHPRVWDIXQGDPHQWDOconcern of journalists and the media themselves. 
7KHUHSRUWRIWKH+LJK/HYHO*URXSGHDOLQJZLWKPHGLDIUHHGRPDQGSOXUDOLVPDOVRsubstantiates this when it emphasises the importance of the ‘quality of sources’ and 
GH¿QHV WKH WDVNRI WKHPHGLDDVGHOLYHULQJKLJKTXDOLW\ MRXUQDOLVP56 Apart from this, the issue is also important for legal regulation and for the state that is required to represent the interests of the community, since the scope of media regulation is obviously limited to the media, and the existence of free, open, diverse but responsible media can only be supported by regulatory methods once such media have been 
SURSHUO\LGHQWL¿HG:HPXVWQRWEHOLHYHKRZHYHUWKDWDXQL¿HGPHGLDFRQFHSWZLOOEH
DSDQDFHDWRWUHDWWKHSUREOHPVQRWHGWKHGLIIHUHQWW\SHVRIPHGLDVHUYLFHVDUHVXEMHFWto different regulatory burdens (even today, in respect of the ‘traditional’ media) and 
WKHLU UROHV LQ GHPRFUDWLF SXEOLF OLIHPD\ RQO\ EH LGHQWL¿HG LQGLYLGXDOO\ WDNLQJ WKHLUdifferent functions, tasks and scopes of editorial responsibility into account.To whom does media freedom belong?The increasingly crowded ‘media ecosystem’
,IZHDUHXQDEOHWRGH¿QHZLWKDEVROXWHFHUWDLQW\ZKDWWKHFRQFHSWRIWKHµPHGLD¶LVcan we at least state who holds the right of media freedom? Who are the actors whose rights should be recognised by the state via the instruments of the law? It would seem reasonable to nominate the owners of the media as holders of the right of media freedom. On the basis of their property right they are entitled to pass decisions on the affairs of their enterprises, to employ or dismiss journalists and editors 
DQG WKH\ DUH IUHH WRGH¿QH WKHSROLWLFDO VWDQFH DQG FXOWXUDO OHYHO RI WKHLUPHGLD<HW
ZKHQZHVSHDNRIPHGLDIUHHGRPLWLVQRWWKHRZQHUWKDW¿UVWFRPHVWRPLQGZKHQZHseek the holder of the right. In the media it is the journalists and the presenters and, 
LQGLUHFWO\WKHHGLWRUVZKRFRPPXQLFDWHLQIRUPDWLRQWRXVLWLVWKH\ZKRKDYHWKHLUVD\while the owners usually remain silent. 56 6HH+LJK/HYHO*URXSQFK
67ANDRÁS KOLTAY: What is press freedom now?If, in keeping with what we have said previously, we look upon the media as an institution, and media freedom as a right held by this institution, then we have to conclude that all ‘constituents’ of this institution are entitled to media freedom. An entirely different issue is that of the protection of journalists and editors from the owners (‘inner press freedom’), a task that is not easy to resolve by legal means, although it can be easily stated in terms of media ethics.57 At the same time, however, in discussing the media the issue of the rights of the audience, or, in a broader sense, the rights of society as a whole should also be raised. 
0HGLDIUHHGRPLVDULJKWZKLFKLVVWLOOKHOGE\WKHPHGLDDOEHLWZLWKWKHTXDOL¿FDWLRQthat its exercise must be in the interest of society (democracy). Following my earlier line of reasoning, at this point the recognition of public interest is not a limitation of media freedom—on the contrary, it is the very essence of that freedom. In parallel with the development of technology, new actors may appear who also claim to be the holders of the right of media freedom. The ecosystem of the media comprises those actors, too, who play a role in transmitting the content to the user. Would they, too, be subjects of media freedom (and, at the same time, subject to the 
REOLJDWLRQVSUHVFULEHGE\ODZ"$FFRUGLQJWRWKH*HUPDQ&RQVWLWXWLRQDO&RXUWPHGLDfreedom is a fundamental right of all actors in the media market whose activities include the delivery of content published via the media to the audience.58 Although they produce no content, media service distributors do perform a certain editorial activity by selecting 
WKHVHUYLFHVWKH\WUDQVPLWWRWKHDXGLHQFHLQWKHLQWHUHVWRIWKHSXEOLFWKLVLVOLPLWHGE\the must-carry and must-offer rules.Today, however, we have to reckon with newer and newer actors in the media market value chain than previously. This phenomenon has been brought about by the proliferation of services that are accessible online. These actors may be involved in a certain type of editorial activity without generating content (content aggregators, search engines, social media, Internet service providers, the content providers of websites that support user comments) or may generate material, such as user generated content or 
FRPPHQWV WKDW ¿QGV LWV ZD\ LQWR WKH PDLQVWUHDPPHGLD EXW ZLWKRXW EHLQJ VXEMHFWto ‘traditional’ editorial responsibility. They can also deliver audiovisual content to viewers in a radically different manner than previously in the form of over-the-top59 services, multi-screen content deployment and so on. It is not clear which of these may be regarded as subjects of media freedom, bearing at least a part of the related responsibilities.57 See 5R\DO &RPPLVVLRQ RQ WKH 3UHVV í )LQDO 5HSRUW (HMSO, 1977). Hungarian media regulations made an attempt (so far not yet applied in practice) to regulate this issue under law, see Article 7 of Act CIV of 2010 on the Freedom of the Press and the Fundamental Rules of Media Content.58 %9HUI*(%HVFKOXGHV(UVWHQ6HQDWVYRP-DQXDU\59 ,IZHZLVK WR SURYLGH D JHQHUDO GH¿QLWLRQRI RYHUWKHWRS VHUYLFHVZH FDQ VD\ WKDW277 VHUYLFHVare those where the service provider providing the service over the Internet is not responsible for the signal 
WUDQVPLVVLRQLWLVDFFHVVHGE\WKHXVHURYHUWKHRSHQ,QWHUQHWDQGLVLQGHSHQGHQWIURPDQGLQQRFRQWUDFWXDOrelationship with the Internet access provider. 
68 Comparative Perspectives on the Fundamental Freedom of ExpressionSeveral actors have vested interests in the media market and these interests may collide with each other. When all is said and done, all these parties have the ability to facilitate the access of their users or audiences to the democratic public sphere. A paper prepared by the European Parliament,60 describes these interested parties as including device manufacturers (producers of television sets, computers, tablets, smartphones, set-top boxes, game consoles and media players), Internet service providers, ‘traditional’ media service providers (mainstream, free-to-air and pay-tv service providers), over-the-top service providers and content producers, social media sites and software developers. These actors are both allies and competitors of each other, and for each of them the question arises as to what extent it is worthwhile or necessary to regulate them.
7KHSKHQRPHQRQRIPHGLDFRQYHUJHQFHKDVEURXJKWDERXWDFXULRXVGHYHORSPHQWas the means used for the publication of media content, along with the content that was previously bound to a single mode of transmission, have begun to converge and overlap, convergence has also appeared among the producers and editors of that content. It is now clear that editing is not exclusively performed by the producer of the media content and that media content is not only produced by the professionals charged with this task. From the previously cited Recommendation of the Council of Europe, we may even infer that content aggregators, application developers and operators of smart platforms and operating systems, as well as Internet service providers, are themselves subjects of media freedom if they bear ‘editorial responsibility’. These mediators appear between 
WKHUHDGHUYLHZHUDQGWKHPHGLDLQHYHULQFUHDVLQJQXPEHUVDQGGLIIHUHQWIRUPVDQG
KDYHDQLQFUHDVLQJFDSDELOLW\WRLQÀXHQFHRUGLVWRUWWKHÀRZRILQIRUPDWLRQEHWZHHQWKH
FRPPXQLFDWRU DQG WKH UHFLSLHQW 1HYHUWKHOHVV LW ZRXOG QRW EH MXVWL¿HG WR DSSO\ WKHsame (legal) assessment to these actors as to the actors of the ‘traditional’ media, ie the subjects of media freedom. Their activities are different in the important regard that these mediators do not produce content, but merely facilitate the transmission to the audience of content produced by others. Since, however, their activity can nevertheless 
TXDOLI\DVDVRUWRIµHGLWLQJ¶DVWKH\DUHDEOHWRGH¿QHRUDWOHDVWLQÀXHQFHWKHVFRSHRIthe transmitted content, certain obligations derived from the positive character of media freedom are applicable to them and should actually be applied in the public interest. In respect of media service distributors, such a legal obligation (must-carry) has long 
EHHQ LQ H[LVWHQFH LQ WKH IXWXUH REOLJDWLRQV LQWHQGHG WR SURPRWH DFFHVV PD\ EHprescribed for the operators of smart platforms, and search engines and Internet service providers may also be regulated. This does not mean that these carrier agents become 60 'LUHFWRUDWH*HQHUDO IRU ,QWHUQDO 3ROLFLHV (XURSHDQ 3DUOLDPHQWThe Challenges of Connected TV. NoteZZZHXURSDUOHXURSDHX5HJ'DWDHWXGHVQRWHMRLQ,32/&8/7B17 
B(1SGI!
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µIXOOÀHGJHG¶ VXEMHFWVRIPHGLD IUHHGRPDQG WKXV WKH UHODWHGREOLJDWLRQVPD\QRWEH
DSSOLHGWRWKHPLQIXOOHJFRPSOLDQFHZLWKWKHUHTXLUHPHQWRIWKHULJKWRIUHSO\UDWKHUthey will assume the role of holders of a certain ‘limited scope’ right of media freedom.On the other hand, these agents must respect the right of others to media freedom, and must ensure the free distribution of content and opinions in the course of their activities. Today, the ‘traditional’ subjects of media freedom need not only be wary of the state when striving to safeguard their freedom from external intervention, but also of these agents. Dawn Nunziato presents a host of concrete examples to illustrate how 
VXFK DJHQWV LQWHUIHUH ZLWK WKH IUHH ÀRZ RI RSLQLRQV$FFRUGLQJ WR KHU FRQWUDU\ WRpopular belief, the major American Internet enterprises do this not only on the basis of their business interests, with the intention of increasing their revenues, but also in respect of political opinions, applying a sort of private censorship. Examples include Internet service providers, who are able to restrict the sending of emails or public access 
WRFHUWDLQFRQWHQWIRUQHZVDJJUHJDWRUVZKRDUHLQDSRVLWLRQWRRPLWFHUWDLQRWKHUZLVH
LPSRUWDQWQHZVLWHPVDQGIRUVHDUFKHQJLQHVWKDWFDQUHVWULFWDFFHVVWRFHUWDLQW\SHVRIcontent.61 The task of the state in these cases is not only to refrain from intervening in 
WKHH[HUFLVHRIPHGLDIUHHGRPDSDUW IURPGH¿QLQJDQGRSHUDWLQJ WKHQHFHVVDU\ OHJDOframework), but also to eliminate, or at least minimise, the possibility of intervention by private parties.As the majority of the new types of services lack exact and detailed regulation, they give rise to several novel issues and questions. Although within the EU the single market provides all European service providers with protection and opportunity (although the service providers of an economically weaker Member State will never 
FRPSHWHRQDQHTXDOIRRWLQJZLWK%ULWLVK*HUPDQRU)UHQFKHQWHUSULVHVLWLVXQDEOHWRprovide protection against enterprises outside the Union (which usually come from the USA). Surveys of the Hungarian media market indicate that content aggregators (eg 
*RRJOH DQG VRFLDO PHGLD HJ )DFHERRN SRVH D WKUHDW WR WKH H[LVWHQFH RI QDWLRQDOcontent producers by siphoning off their vital resource, advertising revenues, while 
RYHUWKHWRSVHUYLFHVHJ1HWÀL[WKDWDUHDOVRPDLQO\$PHULFDQPDNHPDUNHWHQWU\ab ovoGLI¿FXOWIRUWKHPHGLDPDUNHWDFWRUVRIWKH0HPEHU6WDWHV0RUHRYHUWKHVHVHUYLFHVdo not necessarily belong under European jurisdiction and so the scope of their legal obligations may be more limited, and, even if they are established in an EU Member 
6WDWH DV IRU H[DPSOH 1HWÀL[ LQ %HOJLXP WKHPHGLD UHJXODWLRQV RI RWKHU0HPEHUStates do not apply to them.61 Dawn C Nunziato, Virtual Freedom. Net Neutrality and Free Speech in the Internet Age (Stanford 
8QLYHUVLW\3UHVVíí$OWKRXJKWKHERRNZDVSXEOLVKHGLQWKHH[DPSOHVDUHQXPHURXVand impressive, ranging from blocking the non-governmental initiative, AfterDowningStreet.org through the 
FHQVRUVKLSRIWKHRQVODXJKWRIWKHVLQJHUIURP3HDUO-DPRQ*:%XVKWRWKHORSVLGHGWUHDWPHQWRIWKHLVVXHof abortion.
70 Comparative Perspectives on the Fundamental Freedom of ExpressionNew editors and new media service providersOver-the-top services and smart platformsOver-the-top (OTT) media services are those media services that are accessed by users through the open Internet, the providers of which bear no responsibility for signal transmission, ie the user’s Internet service provider is independent of the OTT service provider. While the range of OTT services is not limited to media services we shall not discuss the other types of services (eg speech and messaging) here. OTT is not, then, 
DVHUYLFHEXWDPHWKRGRIUHDFKLQJWKHXVHUDXGLHQFH7KLVQHZW\SHRIVHUYLFHPD\offer both linear and on-demand audiovisual content, and the various service providers can aggregate the content of different media services on their pages or can produce their own content.62
277PHGLD VHUYLFHVSRVH VHYHUDO OHJDOTXHVWLRQV UHODWHG WR WKHGH¿QLWLRQRIPHGLDfreedom discussed above. First of all, it is questionable how these services should be 
GH¿QHGRQWKHEDVLVRIWKHFXUUHQWOHJDOUHJXODWLRQVDVPHGLDVHUYLFHVDVPHGLDVHUYLFHdistribution, as electronic communications services or, perhaps, as something entirely different). OTT service providers that publish individually downloadable content probably qualify as on-demand media services, while those OTT services that provide ‘live’ broadcasts (streams) of the programmes of other media service providers probably 
GRQRW¿W LQWR HLWKHU FDWHJRU\ ,W LV WKLVXQFHUWDLQW\ WKDW UDLVHVGRXEWV VXUURXQGLQJ WKHquestion of just what regulatory burdens apply to them. A further question is what can be done with the American OTT service providers that are present in the European media 
PDUNHWRUKDYHVWURQJDVSLUDWLRQVIRUHQWU\LVWKHUHDQ\FKDQFHWKDWWKH\FRXOGEHIRUFHGto respect, if not the national media regulations then at least the provisions of the AVMS Directive? (Obviously the answer is yes, if they are considered as entities established in 
DQ\RIWKHPHPEHUVWDWHVRIWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQEXWHYHQLQWKDWVLWXDWLRQWKHVSHFL¿Fregulations of the other member states do not oblige them to do so.)Several further important issues arise in relation to access. The menu, or the ‘application environment’ of smart devices used for the consumption of media content plays an increasingly important role in the ecosystem of digital content deployment. The operators of these menu systems or application environments, play an editorial role 
VLPLODU WR WKDW RI WKHPHGLD VHUYLFH GLVWULEXWRUV LW LV WKH\ZKR GHFLGHZKLFK VHUYLFHproviders’ applications are included in the menu and in what position. This could result in a violation of the principle of equal access, nor is there even any guarantee of at least the transparency of inequality.63 At present, however, by contrast with ‘traditional’ media service distributors, they are not bound by either the must-carry or the must-offer rules.In addition, several further issues related to content regulation (advertisements, protection of minors, media pluralism), competition law, copyright law, privacy and consumer protection arise, as does the question of what will happen to the privileged 62 6HH'LUHFWRUDWH*HQHUDOIRU,QWHUQDO3ROLFLHVQí63 6HH'LUHFWRUDWH*HQHUDOIRU,QWHUQDO3ROLFLHVQ±
71ANDRÁS KOLTAY: What is press freedom now?status of public service media in the future (eg the adaptation of their must-carry rights to the new environment).64 It is likely that Europe (the EU) will not easily give up the objective of passing on the values and considerations supporting media regulation to the new services.65Internet service providersThe dispute over net neutrality (or ‘Internet neutrality’, or the ‘open Internet’) has already built up considerable traditions.66 According to this principle, Internet service providers may not discriminate between the data and content transmitted via their 
QHWZRUNVDQG WKHSUDFWLFHRI WUDI¿FPDQDJHPHQWPXVWEH LQGHSHQGHQWRI WKHFRQWHQWforwarded, the application, the end device connected to the network and the IP addresses of the sender and the recipient.67 The principle of net neutrality demands that Internet service providers provide their service to users according to transparent principles, that they refrain from blocking any—not illegal—content, and do not limit access to such content, and that they do not apply unreasonable discrimination to the range of content, but provide equal access to it68 in the interest of achieving the goal of ‘the operation of the Internet as an open platform that is of fundamental importance from the aspect of the freedom of expression.’69 Several actors have also emerged on the Internet who are independent of the state and who are capable of restricting the freedom of speech. In the case of Internet service providers this can be achieved indirectly, by restricting access to the various opinions. At the same time it should be noted that—at least at present—
PRVWRIWHQ WKHLUPRWLYDWLRQ LVQRW WRH[HUWDQ LQÀXHQFHRQGLVSXWHVRISXEOLF OLIHDQGpolitics, but to promote their economic interests,70 for example by realising revenues from the content providers they advantage.64 LELGíí(XURSHDQ%URDGFDVWLQJ8QLRQQí65 7KH *UHHQ 3DSHU RI WKH (XURSHDQ &RPPLVVLRQ RSHQLQJ WKH GHEDWH SRLQWV LQ WKLV GLUHFWLRQ VHH
3UHSDULQJ RI D )XOO\ &RQYHUJHG$XGLRYLVXDO:RUOG *URZWK &UHDWLRQ DQG 9DOXHV *UHHQ 3DSHU RI WKH
(XURSHDQ &RPPLVVLRQ  HXUOH[HXURSDHX/H[8UL6HUY/H[8UL6HUYGR"XUL &20),1(
13')!66 The debate is still going on both in the EU and in the United States. About its current standing see 
%DOi]V%DUWyNL*|QF]\µ$WWHPSWVDWWKH5HJXODWLRQRI1HWZRUN1HXWUDOLW\LQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQGLQWKH
(XURSHDQ8QLRQ7KH5RXWH7RZDUGVWKH³7ZRVSHHG´,QWHUQHW¶LQ$QGUiV.ROWD\HGMedia Freedom and Regulation in the New Media World (Wolters Kluwer 2014). 67 Body of European Regulators of Electronic Communications, ‘Response to the European Commission’s consultation on the open Internet and net neutrality in Europe’ 30 September 2010, BoR (10) 
 VXPPDULVHG LQ %DUWyNL*|QF]\ Q   ZZZLUJHXVWUHDPLQJ%R5
%(5(&UHVSRQVHB(&FRQVXOWDWLRQB1HWQHXWUDOLW\BILQDOSGI"FRQWHQW,G 	ILHOG $77$&+
('B),/(!68 )&&*XLGH2SHQ,QWHUQHWZZZIFFJRYJXLGHVRSHQLQWHUQHW!,WVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDWDFFRUGLQJto the position of the US communications authority, therefore, ‘reasonable’ discrimination is admissible, 
DQGPD\HYHQEHEDVHGRQWKHHFRQRPLFLQWHUHVWRIWKH,QWHUQHWVHUYLFHSURYLGHUWKLVLVVRPHWKLQJWKDWLVunacceptable to the proponents of net neutrality.69 6HH%DUWyNL*|QF]\Q70 ibid.
72 Comparative Perspectives on the Fundamental Freedom of ExpressionAs such, Internet service providers can become gatekeepers, whose role is, on the one hand, to provide the infrastructure for accessing online content and, on the other hand, to perform certain editorial tasks.71 This latter activity is analogous in one respect to that of media service distributors operating cable networks, as they, too, are able to 
LQÀXHQFH ZKDW FRQWHQW FDQ SRWHQWLDOO\ UHDFK WKH DXGLHQFH DV ZHOO DV LWV FKDQFHV RIactually doing so. At the same time, the capacity of the Internet is much less limited 
WKDQ WKDW RI WKH DQDORJXH FDEOH QHWZRUN XVHUV DUHPXFK EHWWHU DEOH WR FRQWUROZKDW
FRQWHQWV WKH\ µFRQVXPH¶ WKDQ LV WKH FDVH ZLWK FDEOH WHOHYLVLRQ72 and the type of contractual relationship they are in—economic co-dependency, that is characteristic of the relationship between media service distributors and media service providers—does not exist between Internet service providers and content providers. According to a view that is gaining ground in the United States, Internet service providers also enjoy the protection granted by the First Amendment, ie the protection of the freedom of speech and media freedom.73 If this is accepted, they may also be entitled to discriminate between the various contents, because—irrespective of the reasons for 
LW²WKLV VRUWRI µHGLWRULDO¶ DFWLYLW\ DOVRTXDOL¿HV DV D FHUWDLQ IRUPRI H[SUHVVLRQ7KLVnotion, however, is in sharp contrast with the interests related to the unrestricted, open Internet.74 In the United States, this is one of the central issues of the debates surrounding the freedom of speech, and strong objections have been formulated against the notions of the Federal Communications Commission that are made public from time to time.75 To return to Potter Stewart’s observation, according to which the media are the only private enterprises which enjoy constitutional protection (see section 1.1 above), McChesney and Foster object that since at a previous stage of technical development the publicly owned communications networks became the private property of the communications service providers, which now also enjoy constitutional protection, in the future these private enterprises may assume the role of censors (ie may discriminate 
EHWZHHQ RSLQLRQV E\ GH¿QLQJ WKH FRQGLWLRQV RI DFFHVV \HW WKH\ GR QRW WDNH RQ WKHresponsibilities that go hand in hand with media freedom according to American legal thinking.76 If, however, Internet service providers do have a right to media freedom—and this is a question that may already be raised in Europe too—and thereby the law does not 71 $PLW06FKHMWHUDQG0RUDQ<HPLQLµ³-XVWLFHDQG2QO\-XVWLFH6KDOO3XUVXH´1HWZRUN1HXWUDOLW\the First Amendment and John Rawls’s Theory of Justice’ (2007) 14 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review 167.72 ibid.73 LELG DQG1LFKRODV%UDPEOH µ,OO7HOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQV+RZ ,QWHUQHW ,QIUDVWUXFWXUH 3URYLGHUV /RVHFirst Amendment Protection’ (2010) 17(1) Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review 109.74 See Schejter–Yemini (n 71) 173.75 0RVWUHFHQWO\VHHIRUH[DPSOHWKHSRVLWLRQVWDWHPHQWRI)UHHGRP+RXVHµ7KH8QLWHG6WDWHV0XVW
/HDG LQ 8SKROGLQJ 1HW 1HXWUDOLW\¶ ZZZIUHHGRPKRXVHRUJEORJXQLWHGVWDWHVPXVWOHDGXSKROGLQJQHW
QHXWUDOLW\8B21T0LN!76 John B Foster and Robert W McChesney, ‘The Internet’s Unholy Marriage to Capitalism’ (2011) 62(10) The Monthly Review.
73ANDRÁS KOLTAY: What is press freedom now?support the principle of net neutrality in its entirety, exactly what it is that media 
IUHHGRPLQFOXGHVZLWKUHJDUGWRWKHVHSDUWLFXODUVHUYLFHVVKRXOGEHFODUL¿HGDVZHOODVthe restrictions and liabilities that accompany it.Search enginesAccording to Jakubowicz, search engines are ‘information services’ and as such cannot be considered media (this is also supported by the 2011 Recommendation of the Council of Europe, which does not make mention of them), but they ‘create special challenges and pose considerable risks’ to a number of values important in the context of press freedom, as well as to the effective application of regulations such as those for the exclusion of access to infringing contents, discrimination between various types of 
FRQWHQWDQGLQÀXHQFLQJWKHH[HUFLVHRIWKHIUHHGRPRIRSLQLRQDQGIRUSUHYHQWLQJWKHfragmentation of public life and the distortion of market competition.77
6HYHUDOOHJDOLVVXHVKDYHDULVHQLQFRQQHFWLRQZLWK*RRJOHWKHODUJHVWHQWHUSULVHLQ
WKHRQOLQHZRUOG$QXPEHURIWKHVHUHODWHWRWKHXQLTXHHGLWRULDOUROHSOD\HGE\*RRJOHand by search engines in general.787KHVHDUFKHQJLQHLVRQO\RQHRI*RRJOH¶VVHUYLFHValbeit the most used one, which is indispensable to Internet usage and which has several magnitudes more users than its competitors combined. Rather than producing content 
LWVHOI *RRJOH¶V VHDUFK HQJLQH VHUYLFH SXEOLVKHV WKH FRQWHQWV RI RWKHUV LQ WKH RUGHUdictated by the company’s algorithms. At the same time, the search engine is involved in ‘editing’, since it ranks content, which is something that could lead to or further aggravate legal infringements.79 The personality rights-infringing nature of the system of autocomplete suggestions that record frequent searches and provide recommendations on the basis of them has also been pointed out.80 Furthermore, in respect of the ‘right to 
EH IRUJRWWHQ¶ ZKHUHE\ *RRJOH LV REOLJHG WR UHPRYH IURP WKH VHDUFK UHVXOWV FHUWDLQcontent that does not serve the public interest and is injurious to the applicant), the enterprise performs direct editorial tasks which may even extend over opinions of 77 See Jakubowicz (n 52) 3, 34–35.78 The scope of the present paper, however, does not include the issues raised by search engines and, in 
SDUWLFXODUE\*RRJOHXQOHVVWKRVHLVVXHVDUHGLUHFWO\UHODWHGWRWKHIXQGDPHQWDOVRIWKHIUHHGRPRIWKHSUHVV
6XFK IRU H[DPSOH DUH WKH DOOHJHGDQWLWUXVWYLRODWLRQV FRPPLWWHGE\*RRJOH VHH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ
µ$QWLWUXVW&RPPLVVLRQSUREHV$OOHJDWLRQVRI$QWLWUXVW9LRODWLRQVE\*RRJOH¶3UHVVUHOHDVH1RYHPEHU
 (XURSHDQ &RPPLVVLRQ µ6WDWHPHQW RQ WKH *RRJOH ,QYHVWLJDWLRQ¶ 3UHVV UHOHDVH  )HEUXDU\ 
)RUDFRPSUHKHQVLYH UHYLHZRI WKH OHJDO LVVXHV UHODWHG WRVHDUFKHQJLQHV VHH-DPHV*ULPPHOPDQQ µ7KHStructure of Search Engine Law’ (2007) 93 Iowa Law Review 1.79 The order of the search results and the prominent ranking of infringing content among them may 
FRQWULEXWHWRDQGVWUHQJWKHQWKHHIIHFWRIDFWVYLRODWLQJKRQRXUDQGUHSXWDWLRQVHHµ)UHQFKEORJJHU¿QHGRYHU
UHYLHZ¶V*RRJOHVHDUFKSODFLQJ¶%%&1HZV-XO\ZZZEEFFRPQHZVWHFKQRORJ\!80 &RULQQD&RRUV µ5HSXWDWLRQV DW6WDNH7KH*HUPDQ)HGHUDO&RXUW¶V'HFLVLRQFRQFHUQLQJ*RRJOH¶VLiability for Autocomplete Suggestions in the International Context’ (2013) 5 Journal of Media Law 322.
74 Comparative Perspectives on the Fundamental Freedom of Expressionpolitics and public life.81 Let us not dwell upon the criticism of the decision of the European Court of Justice on this issue or the fact that the decision can hardly be 
UHJDUGHGDV WKH¿QDOVROXWLRQ WR LWVXI¿FH LW WRVD\ WKDW LQ WKHZDNHRI WKLVGHFLVLRQ
*RRJOHFOHDUO\DQGLQDOHJDOO\PDQGDWRU\PDQQHUEHFDPHDQµHGLWRU¶²DOEHLWDJDLQVWits will and only in a certain regard—while the company had previously been engaged in such editing according to its own priorities and interests, too.
7KHDOJRULWKPZKLFK*RRJOHXVHVWRUDQNVHDUFKUHVXOWVLVQRWSXEOLF:KDWZHGR
NQRZ DERXW LW LV WKDW *RRJOH¶V EXVLQHVV LQWHUHVWV LQÀXHQFH WKH VHDUFK UHVXOWV LH
FRPSDQLHV SD\*RRJOH WR HQVXUH WKDW WKHLUZHEVLWHV HQG XS DW WKH WRS RI WKH OLVW LQ
SULQFLSOHWKLVLVRQO\WUXHIRUWKH¿UVWWKUHHSODFHVLQWKHUDQNLQJRIVHDUFKUHVXOWVRQWKH
EDVLV RI *RRJOH¶V $G:RUGV VHUYLFH KRZHYHU WKH OLVWLQJ V\VWHP LV QRW HQWLUHO\transparent). At the same time, the service provided by search engines may not only serve business, but political interests as well. The most popular, state-owned, Chinese search engine, for example, does not list websites that stand for the creation of democracy in China. According to the US Manhattan District Court, by acting in this way, the search engine is simply exercising its right protected by the First Amendment, ie such peculiar ‘editing’ enjoys the protection of the freedom of speech and media freedom.82 Co-authors Volokh and Falk take a similar position, saying that the activities of search engines assume editorial decision-making roles similar to those of press publishers.83
,QDVRPHZKDWVLPLODUFDVH*RRJOHWRRNDFWLRQDJDLQVWDGYHUWLVHPHQWVE\86KHDOWK
LQVWLWXWLRQVWKDWUHMHFWDERUWLRQ8VLQJRQHRI*RRJOH¶VPHWKRGV LIRQHVHDUFKHVIRUDgiven term (‘abortion clinic’ in the present case), then, on the page listing results, paid advertisements will also appear alongside the ‘genuine’ results (in the present case, the websites of institutions that reject abortion and offer alternative solutions). According to the complaint from ‘genuine’ abortion clinics, such advertisements mislead the users 
RI WKH VHDUFK HQJLQH$FFHSWLQJ WKH FRPSODLQW *RRJOH GHOHWHG WKH DGV LQ TXHVWLRQ81 6HHWKHMXGJPHQWRIWKH(XURSHDQ&RXUWRI-XVWLFHLQFDVHQR&Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja González. In connection with the problem 
RI µGLVDEOLQJ WKH VHDUFKDELOLW\ RI SROLWLFDO RSLQLRQV¶ VHH µ*RRJOH UHYHUVHV GHFLVLRQ WR GHOHWH %ULWLVK
QHZVSDSHU OLQNV¶ 5HXWHUVFRP  -XO\  ZZZUHXWHUVFRPDUWLFOHXVJRRJOHVHDUFKHV
LG86.%1)/!DQGµ*RRJOHUHPRYLQJ%%&OLQNZDV³QRWDJRRGMXGJHPHQW´¶%%&1HZV
 -XO\ZZZEEFFRXNQHZVWHFKQRORJ\!)RU DQ H[WHQVLYH DQDO\VLV VHH'DYLG/LQGVD\
µ7KH³5LJKWWREH)RUJRWWHQ´E\6HDUFK(QJLQHVXQGHU'DWD3ULYDF\/DZ$/HJDO$QDO\VLVRIWKH&RVWHMDRuling’ (2014) 6 Journal of Media Law 159.82 Jian Zhang et al v Baidu.com, Inc., United States District Court Southern District of New York, 11 Civ. 3388 (27 March 2014). See also ‘China’s Baidu Defeats US Lawsuit over Censored Search Results’ 
5HXWHUVFRP ZZZUHXWHUVFRPDUWLFOHXVEDLGXFKLQDODZVXLWLG86%5($496!
)RUDQRWKHUGHFLVLRQWKDWDI¿UPHGWKHVHDUFKHQJLQHSURYLGHUV¶ULJKW WRIUHHVSHHFKVHHS Louis Martin v Google, Inc.,&*&&DO6XS&W1RYHPEHU83 Eugene Volokh and Donald M Falk, ‘First Amendment Protection for Search Engine Search Results’ 
SDSHUVVVUQFRPVROSDSHUVFIP"DEVWUDFWBLG !$ERXWDFRQWUDU\SRVLWLRQVHH2UHQ%UDFKDµ7KH
)RONORUHRI,QIRUPDWLRQDOLVP7KH&DVHRI6HDUFK(QJLQH/DZ¶Fordham Law Review 1629. 
75ANDRÁS KOLTAY: What is press freedom now?Although indirectly, it thereby took a certain stand on an important public issue. Even if we accept that the basis for deleting the ads was to combat deceptive advertising, the restriction of the exercise of the freedom of speech is clear.84Matthew Hindman concludes that the operation of search engines is not democratic, since they direct attention to a mere fraction of the existing content. This, of course, is inherent in the concept of any kind of ‘listing’, but the publication and transparency of the listing criteria and the requirement to take democratic considerations within those criteria into account—such as diversity, or at least similar chances for different opinions to make their way to the public—are reasonable demands. Another contributing factor 
LVWKHW\SLFDOEHKDYLRXURIXVHUVDVXVHUVVHDUFKLQJIRULQIRUPDWLRQDUHXVXDOO\VDWLV¿HGwith the content preferred by the search engine. Accordingly, the number of public affairs websites with a measurable number of visitors is surprisingly low, even in the United States (ie the market shows strong concentration on the Internet, too), and the most effective opinion leaders on the Internet are the same major media enterprises 
ZKLFKSOD\DNH\UROHLQWKHRIÀLQHZRUOGDVZHOORUWKRVHEORJJHUVZKRVHTXDOL¿FDWLRQV
EDFNJURXQG DQG VRFLDO SRVLWLRQ ZRXOG JUDQW WKHP D SURPLQHQW SODFH LQ WKH RIÀLQHmedia, too.85 Similarly to the paradigm of net neutrality, the concept of search engine neutrality 
DOVR H[LVWV $FFRUGLQJ WR -DPHV *ULPPHOPDQQ WKHVH SULQFLSOHV LQFOXGH HTXDOLW\between the various websites, the production of results that objectively conform to the search terms entered, restraint from bias, the suspension of the self-interest of the search engines and the transparency of the search algorithms.86$WWKHVDPHWLPH*ULPPHOPDQQpoints out that, although apparently intended to achieve equality between the various contents, in actual fact full search neutrality actually contributes to the maintenance of 
LQHTXDOLWLHV FDXVHG E\ ¿QDQFLDO WHFKQLFDO DQG RWKHU GLIIHUHQFHV WKDW LV DOWKRXJK
*RRJOH¶VPHWKRGVGLVWRUWWKHSXEOLFVSKHUHHYHQDSULQFLSOHGVROXWLRQWRWKHSUREOHP
ZRXOGQRWEHVXI¿FLHQWWRHOLPLQDWHGLVWRUWLRQ87Social mediaOne of the consequences of the spread of social media services was that the market positions of the printed and online press products deteriorated even further with the widespread use of these services, thereby transforming reading (consumption) habits.88 84 µ*RRJOH5HPRYHV$QWL$ERUWLRQ$GV'HHPHG'HFHSWLYH¶:DOO6WUHHW-RXUQDOEORJVEORJVZVMFRP
GLJLWVJRRJOHUHPRYHVDQWLDERUWLRQDGVGHHPHGGHFHSWLYH!85 Matthew Hindman, The Myth of Digital Democracy (Princeton University Press 2008).86 -DPHV*ULPPHOPDQQµ6RPH6FHSWLFLVP$ERXW6HDUFK1HXWUDOLW\¶LQ%HULQ6]RNDDQG$GDP0DUFXV(eds), The Next Digital Decade: Essays on the Future of the Internet. Is Search Now an ‘Essential Facility’? (TechFreedom 2010) 438.87 ibid 459.88 Lili Levi, ‘Social Media and the Press’ (2012) 90 North Carolina Law Review±(PLO\Bell, ‘What’s the Right Relationship Between Technology Companies and Journalism?’ The Guardian, 23 
1RYHPEHU  KWWSZZZWKHJXDUGLDQFRPPHGLDPHGLDEORJQRYVLOLFRQYDOOH\FRPSDQLHVjournalism-news>.
76 Comparative Perspectives on the Fundamental Freedom of ExpressionThe youngest generations have long forgotten what it is to hold the printed press in their hands. Moreover, even on the Internet they tend to look for brief and quickly digestible content (of a few lines) with eye-catching titles, and not to click on the website of the online press product originally publishing that content. Hence, Facebook 
RU*RRJOH1HZVIRUH[DPSOHFDQJHQHUDWHVXEVWDQWLDOUHYHQXHIRUWKHPVHOYHVZLWKRXWproducing any of their own online content. These services simply collect the content of others. All this would seem to foreshadow the decline of investigative journalism, which is an extremely expensive genre.89 Basically, social media cannot be considered as a subject of media freedom, for two reasons. On the one hand, social media services cannot be considered as press products or media services and hence do not fall under the scope of media regulations. On the other hand, they do not produce or edit their ‘own’ content. What they are doing (collecting user content and providing a platform for it) does not resemble the ‘traditional’ activity of media. Social media themselves therefore cannot be considered, from the perspective of legal regulations, as ‘media’ since they do not carry out any editorial activity, at least not in the traditional sense. They do not make a selection of content prepared by the journalists working according to their instructions, as an editor-in-chief of a newspaper would normally do, but rather they offer, or present, lists of different content for their 
XVHUV DFFRUGLQJ WR SUHGH¿QHG DOJRULWKPV +RZHYHU WKH FRQWHQW LWVHOI LV DOZD\Vproduced independently from the social media platform (eg Facebook). Furthermore, it 
LV IXQGDPHQWDOO\ WKHXVHU¶VGHFLVLRQ E\GH¿QLQJ WKHLU IULHQGV DQG WKH FRQWHQWZKLFKthey follow) that determines the scope of content displayed for them, and the operation of social media sites lacking ‘editing’ algorithms (Instagram, Twitter) is based even more on the user’s decision. Although the collection and delivery or presentation of content by social media can also be considered as a kind of editing, it is not, however, 




77ANDRÁS KOLTAY: What is press freedom now?the press to reach their audience as a unique distributor or intermediary, in practice the relationship between social media and the online press also involves many disadvantages for the latter. News service in transitionNot only those who envisage the death of old-fashioned journalism and investigative journalism, but also less pessimistic observers have pointed out numerous problems caused by the spread of the Internet. Robin Foster examined the options for news diversity in the digital era in a paper published in 2012. His starting point was that although the Internet seemingly contributes a great deal to the distribution, and increase in diversity (the number of sources) of news, it still entails new risks. These risks arise from the activities of ‘digital intermediaries’. According to Foster, these intermediaries 
QHZV DJJUHJDWRUV VXFK DV<DKRR VHDUFK HQJLQHV VXFK DV*RRJOH VRFLDOPHGLD VLWHVsuch as Facebook and online stores and devices such as Apple) can control the news available on the Internet to a great extent, as (1) they represent bottlenecks, through 
ZKLFKWKHXVHUVJHWWKHLUQHZVWKH\PDNHHGLWRULDOW\SHGHFLVLRQVDERXWZKLFKQHZV
LWHPVWRWUDQVPLWRUPDNHDYDLODEOHWKH\VKDSHWKHIXWXUHEXVLQHVVPRGHOVRIQHZV
VHUYLFHVDQGWKH\DUHLQFOLQHGDQGDEOHWRLQÀXHQFHSROLWLFDODJHQGDV90 Accordingly, the activities of these intermediaries need to be regulated for the purpose of ensuring democratic publicity, or more precisely, to ensure the right of citizens to have access to the news.91Independently from this, the Internet has started to erode the obstacles standing between professional journalists and independent opinion leaders and has contributed to the democratisation of journalism, at least in a sense that it has made possible the 
HPHUJHQFHRIPRUHYRLFHVLQWKHSXEOLFVSDFH+RZWKH,QWHUQHWZLOOLQÀXHQFHWKHIXWXUHof journalism, however, is at least open to question. First, the Internet news services and 
VRFLDO QHWZRUNLQJZHEVLWHV KDYH JUHDWO\ WUDQVIRUPHG WKH IRUPHU UHDGHU  XVHU KDELWVand turned a considerable public away from professional media products, thereby undermining the economic foundations of the latter.92 Second, the news aggregator sites 
DQGVRFLDOQHWZRUNLQJZHEVLWHVSUR¿WDOVRIURPWKHFRQWHQWSURGXFHGE\SURIHVVLRQDOjournalists, without any real performance on their part (i.e. content production), thereby disrupting the earlier business models.93 Third, the change in user habits does not affect certain key characteristics of the former status quoHYHQWKHVHGD\VWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWmedium (the one generating the most advertising revenues) in the media market is 90 Robin Foster, News Plurality in a Digital World (Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism 2012) 25–42.91 )RVWHUSURSRVHVWKDWWKHLQWHUPHGLDULHVVKRXOGWUDQVPLWDSUHGH¿QHGDPRXQWRIQHZVRISXEOLFLQWHUHVWthrough all means, coming from different sources, and an independent body should be established which 
ZRXOGDQDO\VHWKHSUDFWLFHRIDFFHVVDQGZRXOGUHFHLYHUHODWHGFRPSODLQWVLELGí92 ibid 16–24.93 The impact of the operation of online aggregators. ibid. 
78 Comparative Perspectives on the Fundamental Freedom of Expressiontelevision, the number one source of news,94 whereas the blogs, regarded as independent forums, do not attract great masses at all,95 and for the most part, the most dominant 
RIÀLQH PHGLD FDQ ERDVW RI WKH VWURQJHVW DQG PRVW SRSXODU RQOLQH YHUVLRQV RQ WKHLUwebsites. Hence, in this respect, market conditions have not been drastically rearranged as a result of the spread of the Internet.96 The world of news services is thus changing, but not necessarily in the way one could have hoped for. The biggest loser in the market restructuring is the primary ‘home’ of serious journalism, the printed press. Though the voices replacing the printed press are indeed numerous, their power is negligible and their function is not the same as that of professional journalism. The breed of spare-time writers or (on the contrary) elite opinion leaders disguised as ‘independent bloggers’, incapable of investigative 
MRXUQDOLVP GXH WR WKHLU REYLRXV ¿QDQFLDO FRQVWUDLQWV DQG WKH PDLQVWUHDP PHGLDproducts adapted to the Internet do not especially contribute to the growth of the diversity of content and opinions.Besides these issues, it is almost only a matter of detail to decide what we should do about the obligation of balanced coverage (impartiality) imposed on ‘traditional’ television and radio in most European states. A possible answer is that, since the former scarcity of access has been eliminated and hence, in this new media world, everyone can obtain information from countless sources, the former solutions of regulation therefore have become redundant, or one could say anachronistic.97 By contrast, Steven Barnett and Mike Feintuck argue for the maintenance of balanced (impartial) coverage, emphasising the importance of reliable media operating under ethical standards which are taken seriously, even in the new media environment.98 As Barnett notes, as long as television journalism can be differentiated from Internet journalism, there is no reason 
WR VWRS KDYLQJ PHGLDVSHFL¿F UXOHV99 Feintuck argues that the former assumption, suggesting that, in a free and unrestricted media market, a diversity of opinions would automatically appear and hence impartiality would be created, proved to be false.100 
$V5LFKDUG6DPEURRNDUJXHV µLI WKHZRUGV³LPSDUWLDOLW\´DQG µREMHFWLYLW\¶KDYH ORVW
WKHLUPHDQLQJVZHQHHGWRUHLQYHQWWKHPRU¿QGDOWHUQDWLYHQRUPVWRJURXQGMRXUQDOLVPand help it serve its public purpose—providing people with the information they need to be free and self-governing.’101    94 James Curran, ‘Reinterpreting the Internet’ in James Curran – Natalie Fenton – Des Freedman (eds), Misunderstanding the Internet5RXWOHGJHí    95 LELGí+LQGPDQQ    96 Curran (n 94) 19.    97 A good summary of this issue is provided by Mike Feintuck who takes an opposing standpoint in 
µ,PSDUWLDOLW\ LQ1HZV&RYHUDJH7KH3UHVHQW DQG WKH)XWXUH¶ LQ0HUULV$PRV± -DFNLH+DUULVRQ±/RUQDWoods (eds), Freedom of Expression and the Media (Nijhoff 2012) 88.    98 ibid, and Steven Barnett, ‘Imposition or Empowerment? Freedom of Speech, Broadcasting and Impartiality’ in Amos–Harrison–Woods (n 97).    99 Barnett (n 98) 58.100 Feintuck (n 97) 88.101 Richard Sambrook, Delivering Trust: Impartiality and Objectivity in the Digital Age (Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism 2012) 39.
79ANDRÁS KOLTAY: What is press freedom now?New content producers—old and new holders of responsibilityThere are several issues surrounding user-generated content but we shall only dwell on 
WKRVH WKDW UHODWH WR WKH ¿HOG RI WKH PHGLD XQGHUVWDQGLQJ µPHGLD¶ DV D SURIHVVLRQDOactivity of a commercial nature). One approach holds that if users produce content they shall qualify as journalists, just as professional journalists do and therefore they are entitled to equal rights, bear equal responsibilities and are subject to the same ethical rules as apply to professional journalists.102 However, it is clear from our previous reasoning that the interpretation of the concept of media freedom we have arrived at necessitates a distinction between ‘media’ and ‘non-media’ (professional journalists and occasional commentators) precisely in order to avoid the devaluation of the concepts of the media and of media freedom. Accepting this, we have to take a position on the question of whether the media bear responsibility if they include such content among their own content (if the statuses of professional journalists and users were identical, this question would not arise at all).With regard to user generated content, therefore, it is not clear who is liable for any infringing nature of the content. Although the earlier responses offered by legal systems prior to the emergence of the online world seemed to favour the position that it is the adopting medium that is responsible for the adopted content, the court decisions arrived at according to this logic are generating widespread and strong protest.103Although the ECtHR has taken no universal position on this issue, it did indicate in two decisions that the unsatisfactory resolution of this question within the legal systems of the Member States may lead to infringements of the rights provided for by the ECtHR. In the Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel v Ukraine case104 the 
VDQFWLRQDJDLQVWWKHDSSOLFDQWQHZVSDSHUIRUSXEOLVKLQJOLEHOORXVXVHUFRQWHQWTXDOL¿HGas infringing, due to a lack of clear provisions on liability in Ukrainian law. In the KU v Finland case105 LW TXDOL¿HG DV DQ LQIULQJHPHQW RI WKH ULJKW WR D SULYDWH OLIH WKDW QReffective remedy existed under Finnish law to reveal the identity of the person who had posted an erotic ad on the Internet in the name of the complainant minor. In another 
FDVH D *HUPDQ FRXUW GHFLVLRQ KHOG WKH ZHE HQF\FORSDHGLD:LNLSHGLD OLDEOH IRU WKHlibellous content inserted into an article by one of the authors of the encyclopaedia, 102 7DUODFK0F*RQDJOH µ8VHUJHQHUDWHG&RQWHQW DQG$XGLRYLVXDO1HZV7KH8SV DQG'RZQV RI DQUncertain Relationship’ Open Journalism. IRIS plus, 2013-2, 13.103 ‘European Court strikes serious blow to free speech online’ Statement of Article 19, 14 October 
 KWWSZZZDUWLFOHRUJUHVRXUFHVSKSUHVRXUFHHQHXURSHDQFRXUWVWULNHVVHULRXVEORZWR
IUHHVSHHFKRQOLQH! µ5XOLQJ RI+XQJDULDQ &RQVWLWXWLRQDO &RXUW FDQ IXUWKHU FXUE IUHHGRP RI H[SUHVVLRQ
ZDUQV26&(PHGLDIUHHGRPUHSUHVHQWDWLYH¶9LHQQD0D\KWWSZZZRVFHRUJIRP!104 Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel v Ukraine $SS QR  MXGJPHQW RI 0D\2011).105 KU v Finland$SSQRMXGJPHQWRI'HFHPEHU
80 Comparative Perspectives on the Fundamental Freedom of Expressioneven though, according to the editorial principles of Wikipedia, anyone may freely write articles or amend or correct existing ones and the operator of the site is not aware of the identities of its authors.106
$WWKHVDPHWLPH7DUODFK0F*RQDJOHSRLQWVRXWWKDWWKHHGLWRULDOPHWKRGRUFRQWUROemployed may also affect the extent of liability, as the various forms of moderation—
SUHOLPLQDU\SRVWHULRUDFWLYHUHDFWLYH²DOORZLQSULQFLSOHWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIGLIIHUHQWrules related to liability.107 (Accordingly, in principle, the stronger the editorial control is, the greater the liability could be. In practice, this would mean that the existence or non-existence of moderation of Internet forums would be a decisive factor in deciding whether or not the service provider of the given forum is at the same time the ‘editor’ of the given forum, and hence moderated forums would become closer to the traditional concept of media.)Jackie Harrison highlights the quality problems of user generated content as regards accuracy, informedness and comprehensiveness.108 In this respect Lorna Woods declares that ‘the issue is more complex than simply that of more speech equals more freedom.’109 Media freedom is intended to protect content produced by high quality, systematic and 
UHOLDEOH ZRUN WKLV KRZHYHU FDQQRW SUHYHQW XVHUV IURP SURGXFLQJ FRQWHQW QRU FDQadherence to the relevant professional-ethical standards be expected from them. However, this is precisely why appropriate balance is required from the professional media, and prudent decisions need to be made at times about publishing a piece of potentially infringing user-generated content.110The issue of online comments (ie anonymous commentaries attached to an article produced by the professional media or published in a private blog or on a private website) is worthy of separate consideration. To date, no general and mature answer has been provided, even to the question of whether the content service provider of the website, unaware of the identity of the commenter, may be held responsible for the infringing nature of the comment, even though it was not they themselves who published it (but only provided a space for its publication). The answers to the question provided from the legal perspective usually do not preclude the liability of the content service provider. This is demonstrated by both the only decision of this kind from the ECtHR, which decided against the website in question,111 and by a decision of the 106 2/* 6WXWWJDUW 8UWHLO YRP   8  OUEZMXULVGHFJLELQODHQGHUBUHFKWVSUHFKXQJ
GRFXPHQWS\"*HULFKW EZ	QU ! :LNLPHGLD LV OLDEOH IRU FRQWHQWV RI :LNLSHGLD DUWLFOHV *HUPDQcourt rules. PC World  1RYHPEHU  ZZZSFZRUOGFRPDUWLFOHZLNLPHGLDLVOLDEOHIRUcontents-of-wikipedia-articles-german-court-rules.html>.107 6HH0F*RQDJOHQ108 -DFNLH +DUULVRQ µ)UHHGRP RI ([SUHVVLRQ 7KH %%& DQG 8VHU *HQHUDWHG &RQWHQW¶ LQ $PRV±Harrison–Woods (n 97). 109 /RUQD:RRGV µ8VHU*HQHUDWHG&RQWHQW )UHHGRPRI([SUHVVLRQ DQG WKH5ROH RI WKH0HGLD LQ DDigital Age’ in Amos–Harrison–Woods (n 97) 168.110 ibid.111 'HO¿$6 Y(VWRQLD $SS QR  MXGJPHQW RI 2FWREHU 7KH*UDQG&KDPEHU ODWHU
DI¿UPHGWKHGHFLVLRQRIWKH)LUVW6HFWLRQVHHLWVGHFLVLRQWDNHQRQ-XQH
81ANDRÁS KOLTAY: What is press freedom now?Hungarian Constitutional Court.112 The arguments of the proponents of the freedom (ie 
WKHLOOLPLWDEOHVWDWXVRIFRPPHQWVDUHPDQLIROGKRZHYHUZKDWLVLPSRUWDQWIURPWKHperspective of the conceptual elements of media freedom is that all such arguments either deny or disregard the connection between the comment and the content service provider (the ‘media’, if you like) enabling its publication. This means not only that, in most cases, the two parties are not acquainted with each other, but also that, according to the proponents of these arguments, there is no overlap between their interests. Yet, in the 'HO¿ case, it was just such interests that one of the arguments of the ECtHR was built upon, namely that ‘making public the readers’ comments on these articles was part of the applicant company’s professional activity’. The news portal had a vested interest in increasing the number of its readers and comments, as their advertising revenues depended on this.113 The comments, argued the ECtHR, although not authored by employees of the news portal, nevertheless became part of its content. Internet and democratic publicityOn the regulation of the InternetSome of the content made available via the Internet is certainly considered as ‘media,’ even if we are not quite sure where its borders lie. Hence, based on the reasoning given above, the Internet, as a medium, could be made subject to legal regulation. However, the issue of regulating the Internet generates a great deal of uncertainty right from the 
VWDUWLQJ OLQH%HIRUH WXUQLQJ WR WKHYDULRXVTXHVWLRQVRIGHWDLOZHPXVW¿UVWH[DPLQHwhether the Internet, as a medium, can be the subject of a distinct, special set of regulations or not.In the past, every time a new medium became widespread, sooner or later a distinct set of regulations was adopted to govern it (press law, radio law or later the regulations governing electronic media). However, no such special set of rules has been created in the Western world regarding the Internet in the last two decades and more that have passed since the dawn of the World Wide Web. One academic view which became popular from the 1980s onwards proclaimed that the nature of a (media) technology 
GH¿QHV WKH OHJDO IRUP RI LWV UHJXODWLRQ DQG KHQFH WKH ODZ DGDSWV LWVHOI WR WKHtechnology.114 It follows from this approach that, since the Internet is so hard to regulate (due to issues of jurisdiction, implementation and enforcement and problems related to liability), it does not need to be regulated at all. We wish to highlight here that the Internet is not as ‘new’ as it is often held to be, in the sense that it has inherited, or to 112 5HVROXWLRQ1R9$%RIWKH+XQJDULDQ&RQVWLWXWLRQDO&RXUW113 'HO¿ FDVH Q  >@²ZH VKDOO QRW GZHOO XSRQ WKH FRPSOH[ DUJXPHQWV RI WKH FRXUW DQG WKHcriticism thereof, as they are not closely related to our subject matter.114 First see Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom (Harvard University Press 1983).
82 Comparative Perspectives on the Fundamental Freedom of Expressionput it more precisely, respawned numerous problems of the ‘traditional’ media, 
UHSURGXFHG WKHP LQ WKH QHZ HQYLURQPHQW DQG LQ FHUWDLQ UHJDUGV PDJQL¿HG WKHVHproblems, including the spectre of arbitrary state intervention, inequalities in the 
HI¿FLHQF\ RI H[SUHVVLRQ RI RSLQLRQV DQG LQ WKH DFFHVV WR RSLQLRQV DV ZHOO DVcommercialisation. Beyond these, the Internet has also generated new, unforeseen problems, as the new modes of private restrictions jeopardise the diversity of opinions, offer greater scope for the violation of privacy and frustrate the economic foundations of quality journalism. The Internet is far from being lawless. The content available on the Internet is subject to general legislation (civil law, criminal law, etc.) and numerous 
,QWHUQHWVSHFL¿FVXELVVXHVDUHOHJDOO\ZHOOUHJXODWHGPDLQO\DWWKH(8OHYHOHOHFWURQLFcommerce, electronic communications, on-demand media services, right of reply, copyright issues, etc.). If truth be told, however, there is no separate ‘Internet Act’ and the application of the existing legislation is far from being as effective as it is in the ‘traditional’ world. Tambini, Leonardi and Marsden call ‘the ideal of a pristine Internet, free from regulation’, a myth, since it cannot be detached from social life, and hence from all the responsibilities, legal and ethical rules, disputes and harms that come with it.115 Des Freedman reminds us that it is a misconception to regard anything related to the Internet as being ‘inherently subordinated’ to technology.116 According to Freedman, the Internet is a technological system that serves private and public interests at exactly the same 
WLPHDQGDVVXFKLWLVQRWWKH¿UVWLQKLVWRU\117 In line with this approach, it is a totally legitimate proposal that democratic states (and also the representatives not of ‘outsourced’ private interests, authoritarian regimes or non-transparent supranational organisations), recognising the public interest, apply regulations to the Internet in order to ensure both greater access for their citizens and accountability.118
7KHWHFKQLFDOGLI¿FXOWLHVRIUHJXODWLRQDUHQRWDQDUJXPHQWDJDLQVWUHJXODWLRQper se, or at least not a convincing one. Instead, the key question is what we want from the Internet. If we want it to make the greatest possible contribution to the operation of democratic publicity, the diversity of opinions, the democratisation of access to these, 
DQGHOLPLQDWLRQRIWKHHFRQRPLFDQGSROLWLFDOLQHTXDOLWLHVSUHVHQWLQWKHRIÀLQHPHGLDworld then the question arises of whether legal regulation will be able to facilitate the implementation of these objectives. If we feel that certain phenomena related to the Internet expressly jeopardise these objectives then we may well consider trying to eliminate these harms by legal means. However, before inspecting the nature and content of the possible regulations (which topic is not covered by this paper), the current status of the Internet should be assessed—or more precisely the current status of the 115 Damian Tambini – Danilo Leonardi – Chris Marsden, Codifying Cyberspace. Communications Self-regulations in the Age of Internet Convergence (Routledge 2007) 294.116 Des Freedman, ‘Outsourcing Internet Regulation’ in James Curran – Natalie Fenton – Des Freedman (eds), Misunderstanding the Internet (Routledge 2012) 116.117 ibid.118 ibid 98.
83ANDRÁS KOLTAY: What is press freedom now?
RQOLQH SXEOLFLW\ GH¿QHG E\ WKH HQWLUHW\ RI VHUYLFHV PDGH DYDLODEOH RQ WKH ,QWHUQHWwhich, based on their function and purpose, qualify as ‘media’. It is also worth examining how the free market of the Internet operates, without its own proper, ‘sectoral’ Act, with numerous options for circumventing the applicable general legislation, and hence to an extent unconcerned by the law. Obviously, this paper cannot strive to make a thorough and complete assessment. It only aims to indicate possible starting points and aspects of such a study.Nunziato talks about the need to apply the ‘public forum doctrine’, developed in American constitutional law, to the Internet as well. This doctrine stipulates that public spaces (parks, streets, etc.) are legitimate venues for the expression of opinion and hence can only be restricted for good reason.119 Nunziato argues that the Internet should be considered as a public forum, despite the fact that most of the assets operating its infrastructure are owned by private parties.120 This is also corroborated by the train of thought put forward by Robert McChesney and John Foster. They argue that the 
GHUHJXODWLRQ DQG SULYDWLVDWLRQ LPSOHPHQWHG LQ WKH ¿HOG RI WHOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQ DUHprimarily responsible for the concentration of ownership found on the Internet and hence for dimming our hopes of a better Internet.121Equal opportunities—new democracyAccording to a widespread view, the Internet can serve to renew the democratic social 
VWUXFWXUH PRUHRYHU LW FDQ KHOS VRFLHWLHV LQ DXWKRULWDULDQ VWDWHV WR EULQJ DERXW Dgrassroots democratisation. Russell Weaver raises many examples of both of these processes in his book (most typically in the connection between the ‘Arab Spring’ and Twitter use).122 At the same time, James Curran emphasises that, in those societies wishing to embark on the road to democratisation, it was not the Internet or the social networking websites made available via the Internet that generated social change, but 
UDWKHU DOUHDG\ H[LVWLQJ SURFHVVHVZKLFK WKHVH RQO\ DPSOL¿HG DQG ERRVWHG123 Without doubt, the Internet is an extremely effective means for activists to connect with each other, exchange opinions and organise different events. However, the increased 119 )RUWKH¿UVWWLPHLQWKHMXULVSUXGHQFHRIWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWVHHHague v CIO86
1XQ]LDWRQíí120 At the same time, based on this doctrine, the right to the freedom of expression can also be exercised freely, subject to certain restrictions, in private institutions open to the general public, see Pruneyard Shopping Center v Robins, 447 US 74 (1980), and International Society for Krishna Consciousness v Lee, 505 US 672 (1992).121 John B Foster and Robert W McChesney, ‘The Internet’s Unholy Marriage to Capitalism’ (2011) 62(10) The Monthly Review KWWSPRQWKO\UHYLHZRUJWKHLQWHUQHWVXQKRO\PDUULDJHWR
FDSLWDOLVP!122 Russell L Weaver, From Gutenberg to the Internet: Free Speech, Advancing Technology, and the Implications for Democracy &DUROLQD$FDGHPLF3UHVVí123 James Curran, ‘Rethinking Internet History’ in Curran–Fenton–Freedman (n 116) 45.
84 Comparative Perspectives on the Fundamental Freedom of Expressioncommunicational ability should not be confused with the actual impact of such a communication.124 At any rate, the contribution that Internet usage has made to the development of democracy in the Western countries is unclear at best.125 It seems that the political relations of the real world are more or less reproduced on the Internet. The strongest voices on the Internet are actually the duplicated voices of the mainstream 
PHGLDLQWKHRIÀLQHZRUOGZKLOHWKHLQGHSHQGHQWRSLQLRQOHDGHUVLIDQ\DUHIRUFHGWRstay in the background.126 -HURPH%DUURQ¶V UHPDUNIURPWKHV LVVWLOOYDOLG µ7KHtest of a community’s opportunities for free expression rests not so much in an abundance of alternative media but rather in an abundance of opportunities to secure expression in media with the largest impact.’127What is more, no one can say that states which wish to stand up against freedom of speech are without measures against the Internet. States such as Iran or China ‘successfully protect’ their political structure. Furthermore, the Internet lends them a helping hand in suppressing the private sector and in the constant surveillance of their citizens. As such, it seems that the statement that the Internet simply cannot do any harm 
WRGHPDQGVIRUGHPRFUDWLVDWLRQDQGWKHPRYHPHQWV¿JKWLQJIRULWLVVLPSO\IDOVH128Equal opportunities—commercialisationEarly expectations of the Internet were that the new medium could have been the catalyst of a democratisation process of a different nature, meaning that it could have shaken the market positions taken by certain entities in the mainstream media. It was hoped that, since the Internet can be used to express opinions freely and without considerable expense and, since the storage capacity is available for storing a theoretically unlimited amount of content, the Internet could therefore accommodate many more voices and more diverse opinions and the ‘barrier to entry’ (meaning the serious costs required for printed press, radio, television), which so far had crippled the expression of independent opinions, would actually be eliminated. All these would 
EHQH¿WWKHDXGLHQFHWRRDVWKH\FRXOGFKRRVHWKHYRLFHWKH\ZDQWHGIURPDZLGHUDQJH
RIYRLFHV1RH[WHUQDOSOD\HUFRXOGUHVWULFWDFFHVVDQGDFFHVVZRXOGKDYHQRVLJQL¿FDQWcosts for the audience, either.In reality, however, the economic differences did not vanish on the Internet at all. The costs of successful content services are also huge, and hence market scarcity remained - in a different way, but with similar results.129 Everyone else, the many 124 Curran (n 94) 7. 125 Jacob Rowbottom, 'HPRFUDF\'LVWRUWHG:HDOWK,QÀXHQFHDQG'HPRFUDWLF3ROLWLFV (CUP 2010) 243.126 Jacob Rowbottom, ‘Media Freedom and Political Debate in the Digital Era’ (2006) 69(4) The Modern Law Review 489.127 Barron (n 4) 1653.128 See Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion. The Dark Side of Internet Freedom (Public Affairs Publishing 2011).129 Kenyon (n 32) 403.
85ANDRÁS KOLTAY: What is press freedom now?independent bloggers and opinion leaders, are invisible to the general public. Their content is sought after and read by only a few. Not even the Internet is free from corporate dominance, market concentration, gatekeepers controlling content and economics-based exclusion.130 Eli Noam goes so far as to say that the ‘fundamental economic characteristics of the Internet’ suggest that ‘when it comes to media pluralism, the Internet is not the solution, but it is actually becoming the problem.’131 It may seem to be an exaggeration, but there is no doubt that the Internet has failed to bring about a 
PRUH EDODQFHG SOD\LQJ ¿HOG IRU VPDOO DQG ODUJH FRPSDQLHV DOLNH132 Large Internet companies have ‘colonised’ cyberspace.133 The most visited websites are owned, 
ZLWKRXWH[FHSWLRQE\WKRVHFRPSDQLHVWKDWKDYHVWURQJPDUNHWSRVLWLRQVLQWKHRIÀLQHworld and that are interested in business success. Nevertheless, it is undisputed that the Internet actually has increased the latitude for democratic publicity and that this kind of commercialisation contributed to the rapid spread and popularity of the Internet and to the continuous development of technology. 
+RZHYHUWKH,QWHUQHWWXUQHGRXWWREHOHVVFDSDEOHRIIXO¿OOLQJWKHLQLWLDOKRSHVLQYHVWHG
LQLWDVµSUR¿WFRQTXHUVSULQFLSOHV¶134Where is the regulation of media freedom heading,  and what is the role of the state?The Internet has enriched our lives and has contributed to the diversity of the media but simultaneously it has not only reproduced the problems of the ‘traditional’ world of the media but also raised new issues. But the desire for regulation should be carefully kept within the appropriate limits. On the one hand, the legal solution is by no means a panacea but, at best, merely a useful prop for achieving the objectives of public interest 
DQGRQWKHRWKHUKDQGVWDWHLQWHUYHQWLRQLQWKHVWLOOÀXLGQHYHUSUHGLFWDEOHFRQWLQXRXVO\changing Internet is an inherently risky venture, since its effectiveness is doubtful and it may even do greater damage than it was intended to avert. Moreover, due to the very 
QDWXUHRIWKH,QWHUQHWLWVUHJXODWLRQFDQKDUGO\EHWKHWDVNRILQGLYLGXDOVWDWHVLIVXFKregulation is to be effective, it should operate on a European or even on a ‘universal’ level.130 James Curran – Natalie Fenton – Des Freedman, ‘Conclusion’ in Curran–Fenton–Freedman (n 116) 180.131 3KLOLS01DSROLDQG.DUL.DUSSLQHQµ7UDQVODWLQJ'LYHUVLW\WR,QWHUQHW*RYHUQDQFH¶First Monday, 
 'HFHPEHU  KWWS¿UVWPRQGD\RUJRMVLQGH[SKSIPDUWLFOHYLHZ! FLWHG E\ .HQ\RQ (n 32) 404. 132 Curran (n 94) 14.133 Curran (n 123) 54.134 6DQGRU9HJK µ3UR¿W RYHU3ULQFLSOHV7KH&RPPHUFLDOL]DWLRQRI WKH'HPRFUDWLF3RWHQWLDOV RI WKHInternet’ in Katharine Sariakis and Daya K Thussu (eds), Ideologies of the Internet+DPSWRQí
86 Comparative Perspectives on the Fundamental Freedom of ExpressionThe tasks of (EU and Member State level) media regulation will not be limited to 
GH¿QLQJ WKHFRQFHSWRI WKHPHGLDDQG WKHKROGHUVRI WKH ULJKWRIPHGLD IUHHGRPEXWwill also include the creation of truly equal conditions for the media services accessible in Europe (and for the other actors within the value chain of the media market), and the 
GH¿QLWLRQ RI WKH YDULRXV OHYHOV RI UHJXODWLRQ DV WKH\ UHODWH WR WKH GLIIHUHQW W\SHV RIservices. We have to accept that providers of several new types of services now belong among the stakeholders of media freedom. If we are to uphold our earlier principles related to the democratic tasks of the media then besides providing them with rights we may also prescribe duties for them. Several regulatory burdens and solutions could be realistically implemented, even in the near future, such as obliging Internet service providers to refrain from discriminating between content, prescribing transparent operation for search engines, settlement of the issues of copyright with regard to content aggregation and sharing, reinterpretation of the must-carry rules and state support for the ‘quality press’. However, the extent to which these measures would actually contribute to the operation of the democratic public sphere, and what other possible avenues exist for the state to act in the interest of the media are questions for the future.
$OWKRXJK LW ZRXOG EH WHPSWLQJ WR VD\ WKDW WKH ¿UVW VWHS WRZDUGV HTXDO PDUNHWconditions, and one that requires no external approval or consent, would be a dramatic liberalisation of the regulatory environment, in actual fact this would undermine the common foundations of European media regulations. These are the foundations which underpin the protection of the democratic public sphere and the recognition of the 
SXEOLFLQWHUHVWYHVWHGLQLW$WSUHVHQWQHLWKHUWKH(8QRUWKHYDULRXV1*2VDQGLQWHUHVWbodies holding membership in international organisations envisage the elimination of these regulations, and consequently the protection of minors, the right of reply and the prohibition of hate speech, defamation and violation of privacy, as well as the various access rights, the must-carry and must-offer rules, media pluralism and cultural diversity, the regulation of competition, the European programme quotas and publicly funded public service media must remain in place.135 It is an entirely different question, of course, whether the rules may change or may not apply in the same way to each and every service. It is clear, then, that European states face numerous tasks. On the one hand, they have to reach agreement on the details of the new, common European media regulations, 
GH¿QLQJDXQLIRUP UHJXODWRU\ IUDPHZRUN$VROXWLRQHQDEOLQJDFWLRQDJDLQVW VHUYLFHVoriginating from outside of Europe, in the interest of European audiences, must be a part of this. Furthermore, they will have to do something about media regulations in their own Member States. In this respect, ironing out the various national (regulatory) 
SHFXOLDULWLHV LV WKH HDVLHU EXW E\ QR PHDQV QHFHVVDULO\ WKH PRUH H[SHGLHQW RSWLRQnational media regulations may, conversely, be regarded as the ‘cultural products’ of the 135 6HH'LUHFWRUDWH*HQHUDOIRU,QWHUQDO3ROLFLHVQ(XURSHDQ%URDGFDVWLQJ8QLRQQ
87ANDRÁS KOLTAY: What is press freedom now?individual states and thus the values (or, from the aspect of the single market, the necessary nuisances) of a Europe of diversity, just like many other characteristics worthy of preservation.By this logic, the state exercises self-restraint vis-á-vis freedom of speech and the freedom of the press and at the same time it tries to protect these rights against those private interests that are actually capable of restricting them. Clearly, regulation has to live up to its name to accomplish this twofold task. Hence, the state and the system of regulation we are talking about here ‘may not be the state we have and therefore not the regulations to which we are currently exposed, but it is certainly those to which we should aspire.’136136 Freedman (n 116) 117.
